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EDWARD CAVANAGH*
Antitrust Remedies Revisited
In the 115-year history of federal antitrust law, much has beenwritten about substantive liability standards.  Comparatively
little has been written about antitrust remedies.  This inattentive-
ness to remedy was underscored by the Microsoft1 case wherein
the Antitrust Division, having successfully adjudicated Microsoft
a monopolist, scrambled to fashion an appropriate remedy, first
seeking to break up Microsoft2 and ultimately reversing itself and
settling for a conduct decree.3  Putting aside the question of
whether the relief in Microsoft  was adequate, the fact is that the
case law on equitable remedies in antitrust is sparse and dated,
leaving critics to question whether the antitrust laws are suffi-
ciently nimble to meet the needs of a fast-paced, high-tech
economy.
Moreover, changes in enforcement priorities at the Antitrust
Division, which have led to a heavy emphasis on criminal en-
forcement,4 have rekindled the debate over the continuing need
for mandatory treble damages in private civil actions.  The right
of private action, coupled with more aggressive antitrust enforce-
ment by state agencies and foreign governments, has led critics to
argue that antitrust enforcement in the United States is unduly
punitive and may overdeter by chilling potentially procompeti-
* Professor of Law, St. John’s University School of Law; JSD, LLM, Columbia
Law School; JD, Cornell Law School.
1 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2000), aff’d in part,
rev’d in part , 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied , 534 U.S. 952 (2001).
2 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 59 (D.D.C. 2000), aff’d in part,
rev’d in part , 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied , 534 U.S. 952 (2001).
3 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 231 F. Supp. 2d 144 (D.D.C. 2002) (opinion
and order approving consent decree), aff’d sub nom.  Massachusetts v. Microsoft
Corp., 373 F.3d 1199 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
4 R. Hewitt Pate, Assistant Attorney General Antitrust Division, Vigorous and
Principled Antitrust Enforcement: Priorities and Goals, Address Before the Anti-
trust Section of the American Bar Association, at 2 (Aug. 12, 2003) (“Criminal anti-
trust enforcement continues to be a core priority of the Antitrust Division.”),
available at  http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/201241.htm (last visited June 6,
2005).
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tive behavior.5  Finally, the relatively recent spate of multiparty,
multiforum, multijusrisdictional antitrust actions has led some,
including Congress, to question whether current procedures for
handling antitrust litigation are fair and adequate.6
This Article will: (1) describe the current antitrust enforcement
picture; (2) identify problems with the present state of enforce-
ment; and (3) propose changes, both substantive and procedural,
that will improve overall antitrust enforcement.
I
A SNAPSHOT OF THE CURRENT STATE OF
ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT
In enacting the antitrust laws, Congress decreed that competi-
tion would be the guiding principle governing commercial inter-
course.7  Indeed, the Sherman Act8 has been described by the
Supreme Court as the “Magna Carta of free enterprise.”9  To as-
sure unfettered markets and to encourage “the unrestrained in-
teraction of competitive forces,” Congress created a tripartite
enforcement mechanism which empowered the Department of
Justice Antitrust Division, the Federal Trade Commission
(“FTC”), and private parties to prosecute antitrust violations.
Nearly a century after enactment of the Sherman Act, Congress
passed the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of
197610 (“HSR”) which empowered states’ attorneys general to
5 William Breit & Kenneth G. Elzinga, Private Antitrust Enforcement: The New
Learning , 28 J.L. & ECON. 405, 412-13 (1985).
6 Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4.
7 See  N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
The Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter of economic
liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of
trade.  It rests on the premise that the unrestrained interaction of competi-
tive forces will yield the best allocation of our economic resources, the low-
est prices, the highest quality, and the greatest material progress, while at
the same time providing an environment conducive to the preservation of
our democratic political and social institutions.  But even were that premise
open to question, the policy unequivocally laid down by the Act is
competition.
Id.  ABA Section of Antitrust Law, The State of Federal Antitrust Enforcement:  Re-
port of the Task Force on Federal Antitrust Agencies , at 12 (2001) [hereinafter Task
Force] (“[E]ffective and appropriate antitrust enforcement is critical to the perform-
ance of a market economy.”), available at  http://www.abanet.org/ antitrust/pdf_docs/
antitrustenforcement.pdf (last visited June 8, 2005).
8 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
9 United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972).
10 Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat. 1383 (1976).
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sue parens patriae  on behalf of consumers injured in price-fixing
cases.11
A. Enforcement of Federal Antitrust Laws
1. Department of Justice Antitrust Division
The Antitrust Division is armed with broad civil and criminal
enforcement powers.
a. Criminal Powers
Violations of the Sherman Act may give rise to both criminal
and civil liability, but the statute is silent as to the circumstance in
which either or both remedies may be sought.12  As a matter of
Justice Department policy, criminal sanctions are reserved for
the most egregious violations of law condemned by the courts as
per se illegal—price-fixing among competitors and agreements
among competitors to divide markets and thereby raise prices.13
Violations of the Sherman Act are felonies and convicted corpo-
rations currently face fines of up to $100 million thereunder.14
Convicted individuals currently face fines of up to $1 million and
are virtually guaranteed jail time.15  Prosecutors, however, are
empowered under alternative sentencing provisions to seek even
larger fines—up to twice the gain to the defendant or twice the
loss to the victims.16  Thus, for example, Hoffman-LaRoche was
fined $500 million following its guilty plea to charges of price-
fixing as part of an international cartel in vitamins.17  Criminal
11 15 U.S.C. §§ 15c-15h (2000).
12 Id.  § 1.
13 See  Gary R. Spratling, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Antitrust Division,
Transparency in Enforcement Maximizes Cooperation from Antitrust Offenders,
Address Before the Fordham Corporate Law Institute 26th Annual Conference on
International Antitrust Law & Policy (Oct. 15, 1999), available at  http://www.usdoj.
gov/atr/public/speeches/3952.htm (last visited June 10, 2005); Anne K. Bingaman,
Assistant Attorney General Antitrust Division, & Gary R. Spratling, Deputy Assis-
tant Attorney General Antitrust Division, Criminal Antitrust Enforcement, Joint
Address Before the Antitrust Section of the American Bar Association Criminal
Antitrust Law and Procedure Workshop (Feb. 23, 1995), available at  http://
www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/95-02-23.txt (last visited June 10, 2005).
14 15 U.S.C. § 1.  Recently enacted legislation has raised the ceiling on fines for
corporations under the Sherman Act from $10 million to $100 million.  Pub. L. No.
108-237, § 215, 118 Stat. 661, 668 (2004). See infra  notes 110-15 and accompanying
text.
15 15 U.S.C. § 1.  Legislation signed into law in June 2004 raises the maximum fine
for individuals from $350,000 to $1 million.  § 215, 118 Stat. at 668.
16 18 U.S.C. § 3571(d) (2000).
17 In re  Vitamins Antitrust Litig., 209 F.R.D. 251, 254 n.4 (D.D.C. 2002).
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sanctions in antitrust cases, while not insignificant, have histori-
cally been much lower.
In addition to having leeway in choosing antitrust remedies,
the Antitrust Division exercises substantial prosecutorial discre-
tion in determining which types of violations should be prose-
cuted and which violators should be pursued.  To assist the
government in ferreting out wrongful conduct and to encourage
perpetrators to cease their illegal acts, the Antitrust Division has
developed an Amnesty Program covering both corporations18
and individuals.19  Under this program, the first wrongdoer to
come forward and to reveal to the government the existence of
the unlawful conspiracy will be spared any criminal sanctions,
provided that it cooperates with the investigation and was not a
ringleader of the conspiracy.20  In the view of the Antitrust Divi-
sion, the Amnesty Program has been critical to the successful
prosecution of antitrust conspiracies in the last decade, most no-
tably in the international arena.21
b. Civil Powers
In addition to criminal sanctions, the Antitrust Division may
18 U.S. Dep’t of Justice Antitrust Div., Corporate Leniency Policy—1993 , in  4
Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 13,113, at 20,649-21 (Aug. 16, 1994).
19 U.S. Dep’t of Justice Antitrust Div., Leniency Policy For Individuals—1994 , in
4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 13,114, at 20,649-22 (Aug. 16, 1994).
20 U.S. Dep’t of Justice Antitrust Div., supra  note 18, ¶ 13,113, at 20,649-21; U.S.
Dep’t of Justice Antitrust Div., supra  note 19, ¶ 13,114, at 20,649-22.
21 Scott D. Hammond, Dir. of Criminal Enforcement Antitrust Div., Detecting
and Deterring Cartel Activity through an Effective Leniency Program, Address
Before the International Workshop on Cartels, at 1-2 (Nov. 21, 2000), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/9928.htm (last visited June 10, 2005).
Over the last five years, the United States’ Corporate Leniency Program
(“Amnesty Program”) has been responsible for detecting and cracking
more international cartels than all of our search warrants, secret audio or
video tapes, and FBI interrogations combined. It is, unquestionably, the
single greatest investigative tool available to anti-cartel enforcers.  An ef-
fective Leniency Program will lead cartel members, in some cases, to con-
fess their conduct even before an investigation is opened.  In other cases, it
will induce organizations already under investigation to abandon the cartel
stonewall, race to the government, and provide evidence against the other
cartel members.  While the availability of some investigative techniques,
such as consensual monitoring or the compulsion of sworn testimony, may
be limited or nonexistent in jurisdictions where hardcore cartel activity is
not a criminal offense, Leniency Programs can potentially be utilized in any
jurisdiction where such conduct is treated as a criminal, civil or administra-
tive offense.
Id.
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seek treble damages where the federal government has suffered
harm in its proprietary capacity by reason of an antitrust viola-
tion.22  For example, if a federal hospital purchased price-fixed
drugs from a defendant, the government may sue civilly to re-
cover three times the overcharges.  The Antitrust Division also
has broad powers to enjoin violations or likely violations of the
antitrust laws that affect consumers generally.23  For example, the
United States recently obtained an injunction against Visa and
MasterCard, enjoining each organization from enforcing provi-
sions in their respective bylaws which prohibited members’ banks
from issuing credit cards of rival networks, including American
Express and Discover.24  In addition, under the HSR, the Anti-
trust Division is empowered to review mergers prior to their con-
summation.25  The HSR requires parties to a merger to notify
both the Antitrust Division and the FTC of the transaction, and
prohibits the parties from consummating the merger for thirty
days unless the government agrees to permit the merger to go
forward prior to the expiration of the thirty-day period.26  If the
government needs additional information in order to evaluate
the transaction, it may make a “second request” for that informa-
tion.27  In that case, the merger is further delayed until thirty
days after the parties have fully complied with the second re-
quest.28  The vast majority of HSR merger filings are cleared
without challenge, and many are cleared prior to the expiration
of the thirty-day period.  On the other hand, if the government
concludes that the merger is likely to have substantial anticompe-
titive effects, it may sue in federal court to enjoin the merger.
Often, after the government has identified the troublesome as-
pects of a merger, it will agree to drop its opposition if the merg-
ing parties make certain divestitures prior to concluding their
transactions by entering into a consent decree.29
22 15 U.S.C. § 15a (2000).
23 Id . § 16.
24 United States v. VISA U.S.A., Inc., 344 F.3d 229 (2d Cir. 2003).
25 15 U.S.C. § 18a.
26 Id .
27 Id .
28 Id .  As a practical matter, the issuance of a second request will delay a merger
for at least six months.
29 See, e.g. , United States v. AlliedSignal, Inc., 2000-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 73,023
(D.D.C. 2000); United States v. AT&T Corp., 2000-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 73,096
(D.D.C. 2000) (describing that in AT&T’s acquisitions of MediaOne, MediaOne was
required to divest its high speed internet access company). See generally ABA SEC-
TION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 378-88 (5th Ed. 2002).
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2. The FTC
The FTC was created by Congress in 1914 as an independent
federal regulatory agency to administer the FTC Act.30  The prin-
cipal operative provision of the FTC Act is section 5, which pro-
hibits “unfair methods of competition.”31  The FTC consists of a
five-member commission appointed by the President that over-
sees a Bureau of Competition, a Bureau of Consumer Protection,
and a Bureau of Economics.32  The FTC’s antitrust function is
housed in the Bureau of Competition.33  The Bureau of Competi-
tion has coordinate jurisdiction with the Justice Department to
enforce the Clayton Act and sole power to police unfair methods
of competition under Section 5 of the FTC Act.34  The FTC has
no criminal powers, nor does it have authority to recover civil
damages.  The courts, nevertheless, have held that the FTC does
have authority to order disgorgement of ill-gotten gains obtained
by those engaging in unfair methods of competition.35  In addi-
tion, the FTC is empowered to levy substantial fines against
those who fail to comply with FTC orders.36
The principal enforcement weapon in the FTC arsenal is the
cease and desist order.37  While the FTC has broad antitrust pow-
ers and has exercised those powers in a number of areas, its main
antitrust function in the past two decades has been sharing the
role of merger enforcement with the Antitrust Division under
the HSR as described above.
3. Private Actions
The antitrust laws also create a private right of action for indi-
viduals or entities harmed by anticompetitive acts.38  Congress
created the private right of action to supplement public enforce-
30 Act of Sept. 26, 1914, ch. 311, 38 Stat. 717, 719; 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (2000).
31 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2000).
32 Id . § 41; Fed. Trade Comm’n, Internal Organization and Operations , in  4 Trade
Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 9555, at 16,433 (Dec. 20, 2000).
33 Fed. Trade Comm’n, supra  note 32, ¶ 9555, at 16,433-34.
34 Id .
35 FTC v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 62 F. Supp. 2d 25 (D.D.C. 1999).
36 See  Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, Federal Trade Commission Ob-
tains Civil Penalty Against William H. Gates III for Violation of Hart-Scott-Rodino
Act (May 3, 2004) (describing how the FTC imposed a civil penalty of $800,000 on
Microsoft head Bill Gates for HSR disclosure violations), available at  http://
www.ftc.gov/opa/2004/05/gates.htm (last visited June 10, 2005).
37 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (2000).
38 Id . § 15.
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ment because it was aware that the government would not have
the necessary resources to uncover, investigate, and prosecute all
violations of the antitrust laws.39  To encourage private enforce-
ment, Congress built in powerful incentives: mandatory treble
damages; attorneys’ fees for prevailing plaintiffs (although not
for prevailing defendants);40 and in cases where a civil action fol-
lows a successful criminal prosecution, the factual findings in the
criminal action are given prima facie effect in the civil action and,
if applicable, issue preclusive effect.41  Private parties may also
seek injunctive relief in appropriate cases.42
4. States
Notwithstanding the fact that state regulation of monopolies
and monopolistic practices predates enactment of federal anti-
trust laws,43 neither the Sherman Act nor the Clayton Act as
originally enacted provided any formal enforcement role for
states.  In the wake of enactment of anti-monopoly legislation at
the federal level, many states passed “little Sherman Acts” to po-
lice intrastate restraints of trade that were outside the scope of
federal jurisdiction.44  Most of these statutes sat dormant for de-
cades.  State enforcement of federal antitrust laws was initially
limited.  Subject matter jurisdiction over Sherman Act and Clay-
ton Act claims was exclusively federal and therefore state plain-
tiffs could not utilize state courts to bring claims under federal
law.45  Moreover, it was not until the 1942 Supreme Court deci-
sion in Georgia v. Evans46 that a state victimized by an antitrust
violation was recognized as a “person” within the meaning of
39 See, e.g. , Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 642 (1981)
(explaining that the private action “supplements federal enforcement and fulfills the
objects of the statutory scheme”).
40 15 U.S.C. § 15.  Prevailing defendants may, however, be entitled to sanctions if
the plaintiff’s suit is frivolous and those sanctions may include attorneys’ fees. See
FED. R. CIV. P. 11; see also  28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2000) (allowing sanctions against attor-
neys for vexatious behavior).
41 15 U.S.C. § 16.
42 See id . § 23.
43 See, e.g. , Richardson v. Buhl, 43 N.W. 1102 (Mich. 1889). See generally 1 EARL
W. KINTNER, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW § 4.1 (1980).
44 See, e.g. , N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 340 (McKinney 2002) (New York’s Donnelly
Act).
45 15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 26; see  Marrese v. Am. Acad. of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470
U.S. 373, 379-80 (1985); Freeman v. Bee Mach. Co., 319 U.S. 448, 451 n.6 (1943).
46 316 U.S. 159 (1942).
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Section 4 of the Clayton Act so as to be eligible to sue for treble
damages.
Although state enforcement of federal antitrust laws picked up
marginally in the wake of Georgia v. Evans , it was not until the
mid-1970s that Congress created a formal enforcement role for
the states.  As discussed above,47 the HSR authorized state attor-
neys general to sue parens patriae  to recover treble damages on
behalf of natural persons residing in their respective states who
had been victimized by price-fixing.48  The HSR parens patriae
provision, however, was effectively rendered dead on arrival a
year later by the Supreme Court’s decision in Illinois Brick Co. v.
Illinois49 which limited the universe of plaintiffs injured within
the meaning of Section 4 of the Clayton Act to those who had
purchased directly from defendants, and thus excluded most con-
sumers as plaintiffs.
Despite Illinois Brick , state involvement in antitrust enforce-
ment did not wane.  First, states enacted Illinois Brick  repealers
which permitted indirect purchasers to sue in state court.50  Sec-
47 See supra  note 10 and accompanying text.
48 See  15 U.S.C. §§ 15c-15h (2000).
49 431 U.S. 720 (1977). Illinois Brick  has been the subject of extensive debate and
reform proposals. See Task Force , supra  note 7, at 25-26; see, e.g. , ABA Section of
Antitrust Law, Report of the Indirect Purchaser Task Force , 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 993
(1995); ABA Section of Antitrust Law, Report of the American Bar Association Sec-
tion of Antitrust Law Task Force to Review the Supreme Court’s Decision in Califor-
nia v. ARC American Corp., 59 ANTITRUST L.J. 273 (1990); ABA Section of
Antitrust Law, Report of the American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law
Task Force to Review Proposed Legislation to Repeal or Modify Illinois Brick, 52
ANTITRUST L.J. 841 (1983); ABA Section of Antitrust Law, Report of the American
Bar Association Antitrust Law Section Task Force on Legislative Alternatives Con-
cerning Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 46 ANTITRUST L.J. 1137 (1978).
50 Some thirty states permit indirect purchaser suits. Twenty-five states and the
District of Columbia have enacted Illinois Brick  repealer statutes. See, e.g. , ALA.
CODE § 6-5-60(a) (1993) (Alabama); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 44-1408(B) (2005) (Ari-
zona); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16750(a) (West 1997) (California); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 6-4-111(2) (2002) (Colorado) (authorizing the state attorney general to
bring suit for indirect injury to any government or public entity); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 6, § 2108(B) (2005) (Delaware); D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-4509 (2001) (District of
Columbia); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 480-3, -13, -14 (1993 & Supp. 2001) (Hawaii) (al-
lowing the state attorney general to file class action suit on behalf of indirect pur-
chasers); IDAHO CODE ANN. 48-108(2) (2003) (Idaho) (permitting the state attorney
general as parens patriae  to bring suit); 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/7-2 (2002) (Illinois);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-161(b) (Supp. 2002) (Kansas); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10,
§ 1104(1) (West 1997) (Maine); MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW II § 11-209(b) (2000)
(Maryland) (allowing the state and its subdivisions to bring indirect purchaser suits);
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 445.778(2) (2001) (Michigan); MINN. STAT. § 325D.57 (1995)
(Minnesota); MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-21-9 (2000) (Mississippi); NEB. REV. STAT.
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ond, state enforcement became important in the early Reagan
years when antitrust enforcement at the federal level declined
due in part to a string of decisions unfavorable to antitrust plain-
tiffs issued by the Supreme Court in the late 1970s,51 and also
due in part to the minimalist enforcement policies adhered to by
the Antitrust Division and a significant reduction in resources al-
located to that division.52
§ 59-821 (Supp. 2002) (Nebraska); NEV. REV. STAT. 598A.210(2) (Supp. 2001) (Ne-
vada); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-1-3(A) (Michie 2000) (New Mexico); N.Y. GEN. BUS.
LAW § 340(6) (McKinney Supp. 2003) (New York); N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-08.1-
08(3) (1999) (North Dakota); OR. REV. STAT. § 646.775 (2001) (Oregon) (allowing
attorney general to sue on behalf of indirect purchasers); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-26-12
(2001) (Rhode Island) (same); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 370-1-33 (Michie 2000) (South
Dakota); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2465(b) (Supp. 2002) (Vermont); WIS. STAT.
§ 133.18(1)(a) (2001) (Wisconsin).
Three states permit indirect purchaser suits by judicial decision: Iowa, North Car-
olina, and Tennessee. See  Comes v. Microsoft Corp., 646 N.W.2d 440, 451 (Iowa
2002); Hyde v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 473 S.E.2d 680, 684 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996); Blake v.
Abbott Labs., Inc., 1996-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶¶ 71,369, 76,854 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1996).
51 See  Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977); Cont’l
T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977); Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431
U.S. 720 (1977).
52 See  Robert Pitofsky, Antitrust at the Turn of the Twenty-First Century:  A View
from the Middle , 76 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 583, 585 (2002).
The heightened enforcement levels of the 1960s led to a reaction in the
Bar, in the private sector, and in academia.  The result was a steady but
substantial moderation in antitrust enforcement.  By the 1980s, a little
more than a decade later, all that was left of antitrust enforcement at both
the Antitrust Division of the DOJ and the FTC were regular challenges to
hard-core cartels, some facilitating practices that supported cartel behavior,
and a few challenges to very large horizontal mergers that were thought to
contribute to high concentration and cartel-like behavior.  During the eight
years of the Reagan Administration, there was an absence of enforcement
initiated against vertical and conglomerate mergers, monopolization and
attempts to monopolize—at least after the DOJ settled the earlier chal-
lenge to AT&T by supervising a breakup of the telephone monopoly, verti-
cal distribution arrangements, including minimum price-fixing, exclusive
dealing arrangements, and tie-in sales, boycotts, and all forms of discrimi-
natory pricing.  An effort to restore something more than a minimalist anti-
trust enforcement program was initiated during the first Bush
Administration, and many of the practices deleted from enforcement ef-
forts were restored during the period 1988-1992.
Id.  [footnotes omitted]. But see  William E. Kovacic, The Modern Evolution of U.S.
Competition Policy Enforcement Norms , 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 377, 378, 392 (2003)
(characterizing the Pitofsky view as the “pendulum narrative,” the “key factual as-
sumptions” of which “are demonstrably incorrect”).  Rejecting the so-called pendu-
lum narrative, Kovacic adopts a view of the U.S. antitrust experience that “more
strongly emphasizes elements of continuity and the cumulative nature of public anti-
trust enforcement.” Id . at 381. See generally  Robert A. Skitol, The Shifting Sands
of Antitrust Policy:  Where It Has Been, Where It Is Now, Where It Will Be In Its
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This is not to suggest that the Reagan Antitrust Division sat on
its hands.  On the contrary, it pursued an active criminal enforce-
ment agenda, aggressively prosecuting price-fixing and bid-rig-
ging in the road building and government procurement areas.53
It promulgated Merger Guidelines in 1982,54 which serve as the
foundation for modern merger control policies and which, with
some amendment, are still in force today.55  Using the amicus
process, the Reagan Antitrust Division sought to assist the courts
in deciding cases consistent with what it viewed as rational anti-
trust policies.56
Notwithstanding these aggressive activities in the criminal
realm, overall antitrust enforcement suffered.  Severe budget
cuts at the Antitrust Division limited the resources available to
detect and prosecute violations.  In pursuing its criminal agenda,
the Antitrust Division in the 1980s abandoned the resource-in-
tensive, industry-wide enforcement actions of the type brought
by previous administrations.  These policy choices, together with
a series of defendant-friendly Supreme Court decisions in the
late 1970s, noted above,57 led to a decline in private enforcement.
Without government leadership, private parties lacked the re-
sources necessary to detect and prosecute price-fixing on an in-
dustry-wide basis.  Moreover, the road building and procurement
cases that the government did actively prosecute were transac-
tion specific and rarely generated significant follow-on litigation
in the private sector.  In the merger area, few transactions were
challenged by the government under the new Merger Guide-
lines.58  Again, the lack of activity by public enforcers had a neg-
ative spill-over effect on private enforcement.  Finally, to the
dismay of many, the government attempted to use the amicus
process to reshape long-standing antitrust doctrine including the
per se ban on minimum resale price maintenance.59
Third Century , 9 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 239 (1999) (offering an historical nar-
rative of antitrust enforcement policies); Task Force , supra  note 7, at 10 (noting that
some observers view the antitrust policies of the 1960s as “overly aggressive,” and
some view the antitrust policies of the 1980s as “overly tentative”).
53 Kovacic, supra  note 52, at 418-19.
54 U.S. Dep’t of Justice Antitrust Div., Merger Guidelines—1982 , in  4 Trade Reg.
Rep. (CCH) ¶ 13,102, at 20,528 (1988).
55 Kovacic, supra  note 52, at 435; see  Skitol, supra  note 52, at 250-53.
56 See Skitol, supra  note 52, at 251-52.
57 See supra  note 51 and accompanying text.
58 See  Pitofsky, supra  note 52, at 585.
59 Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984).  In Monsanto , the
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Perceiving a gap in public antitrust enforcement, state attor-
neys general, both individually and through the network estab-
lished by the National Association of Attorneys General
(“NAAG”), stepped in to fill that gap.  State attorneys general
not only prosecuted antitrust cases, but also issued policy state-
ments on mergers60 and vertical restraints61 that were at odds
with federal guidelines promulgated by the Antitrust Division.62
The emergence of state agencies as active antitrust enforcers has
been a source of ongoing friction between state and federal regu-
lators over who has the last say on policy matters.  More recently,
foreign governments have expressed concern that, because of the
states’ emergence as regulators, the United States no longer
speaks its antitrust policy with one voice, thus making it difficult
for foreign firms to intelligently weigh commercial risks.63  Simi-
lar concerns have been expressed by the business community,
both domestic and foreign.64
Despite these criticisms, and despite the fact that antitrust en-
forcement at the federal level picked up markedly in the 1990s,
the states’ interest in antitrust enforcement has not waned.  In
the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in California v. ARC
America Corp. ,65 states have carved out an enforcement niche in
indirect purchaser suits arising under state law.  Still, the proper
role of the states in antitrust enforcement remains a topic of
Justice Department had been prepared to file an amicus brief that would argue for
an end to per se  treatment in minimum resale price maintenance cases. See  Stephen
Calkins, The Antitrust Conversation , 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 625, 644 & nn.117-18 (2001).
This plan did not play well in Congress, which threatened to withhold operating
funds to the Antitrust Division if that brief was filed. Id . at 644 & n.117.  The Justice
Department backed down; while it did file an amicus brief in the case, the Antitrust
Division did not propose overruling the per se  ban on resale price maintenance. Id .
60 Nat’l Ass’ n of Attorneys Gen., Horizontal Merger Guidelines—1993 , in  4
Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 13,406, at 21,193 (Apr. 13, 1993).
61 Nat’l Ass’n of Attorneys Gen., Vertical Restraints Guidelines , in  4 Trade Reg.
Rep. (CCH) ¶ 13,400, at 21,151 (Apr. 4, 1995).
62 Compare  U.S Dep’t of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm’n, Merger Guidelines—
1992 , in  4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 13,104, at 20,569 (Apr. 17, 1997), with  U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, Vertical Restraint Guidelines , in  4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 13,105,
at 20,575 (Aug. 17, 1993) (rescinded Aug. 10, 1993).
63 See Edward T. Swaine, The Local Law of Global Antitrust , 43 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 627, 761 (2001) (“[E]ven where state and foreign enforcers agree that particu-
lar conduct or a particular transaction poses antitrust concerns, conflicts may arise
over state cherry-picking.”).
64 Id . at 760-61; see  Stephen Labaton, From the Pipeline to the Courtroom; Gap
on BP Amoco-ARCO Deal is Wide , N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2000 at C1, C23 (describing
concessions demanded by state regulators as a condition for merger approval).
65 490 U.S. 93 (1989).
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heated debate.  Judge Richard Posner, over a decade after ARC
America  was handed down, proposed virtual elimination of state
antitrust enforcement and of state antitrust laws.66  Defenders of
state antitrust enforcement, notably Professor Harry First, argue
that although “[f]itting somewhat uncomfortably into this dual
system” of public and private enforcement of federal antitrust
law, state antitrust enforcement remains vital to the protection of
consumer interests.67  Professor First notes that in obtaining re-
coveries parens patriae  on behalf of injured citizens, “the states
in no way conflict with federal enforcement.”68  Professor First
further argues that states can bring meaningful value added to
antitrust enforcement in those local cases where “a state enforce-
ment agency can more easily understand the market and more
likely benefit consumers.”69  Even under Professor First’s value-
added approach, however, it is hard to make a case for having
the states play a lead role in merger enforcement.  The need for
United States antitrust enforcers to speak with one voice grows
more compelling as the economy becomes more globalized.  The
prospect of having to obtain the approval of not only the federal
government, but also that of one, some, or all of the fifty states
would prove overwhelming. Moreover, it would be quite costly
to foreign firms attempting to consummate cross-border mergers.
While cooperation between federal and state antitrust enforc-
ers has improved markedly in the merger area,70 turf battles con-
tinue to be fought.  The federal government continues to be the
senior partner in cooperative enforcement ventures.  The states,
however, have firmly established themselves as players in the an-
titrust field.
66 Richard A. Posner, Antitrust in the New Economy , 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 925, 940-
42 (2001).
67 Harry First, Delivering Remedies: The Role of the States in Antitrust Enforce-
ment , 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1004, 1004 (2001).
68 Id . at 1039.
69 Id . at 1036.  Professor First acknowledges, however, that this value-added ap-
proach “does not make for a neat division of responsibility between state and fed-
eral enforcers.” Id.
70 See  Fed. Trade Comm’n et al., Protocol for Joint Federal/State Merger Investiga-
tions , in  4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 13,420, at 21,213 (Mar. 18, 1998); see also
Skitol, supra  note 52, at 253-54 (noting the efforts of James Rill of the Antitrust
Division and Janet Steiger of the FTC during the first Bush Administration to elimi-
nate friction with state enforcers).
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5. Foreign Enforcement of the U.S. Antitrust Laws
Foreign plaintiffs constitute a special class of potential antitrust
enforcers.  Because the antitrust laws extend only to cases involv-
ing the domestic or foreign commerce of the United States, cases
involving foreign plaintiffs typically raise threshold issues of
standing and subject matter jurisdiction.71  In Pfizer,  Inc. v. In-
dia ,72 the Supreme Court examined the question of whether a
foreign government is a “person” entitled to sue for treble dam-
ages under Section 4 of the Clayton Act.  In holding that foreign
governments were indeed persons, and therefore were so enti-
tled, the Court in dicta also addressed the question of whether
foreign purchasers generally had standing to sue in U.S. courts
under the antitrust laws.73  The Court reasoned that Congress did
not intend to deny foreign purchasers a remedy when they are
injured by antitrust violations that would give U.S. victims the
right to sue, and further noted that permitting foreign plaintiffs
to sue would enhance antitrust deterrence.74
Pfizer  did not, however, address issues involving the extent to
which federal courts could exercise jurisdiction over antitrust
claims asserted by foreign plaintiffs.  Congress attempted to re-
solve these issues by enacting the Foreign Trade Antitrust Im-
provements Act of 1982 (“FTAIA”).75  The FTAIA purports to
limit the jurisdictional reach of the Sherman Act in cases involv-
ing foreign commerce to situations where foreign commerce has
a “direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect” on do-
mestic commerce and “such effect gives rise to a claim” under
the Sherman Act.76
For years, the FTAIA lay dormant. However, in the wake of
the Justice Department’s aggressive prosecution of foreign car-
tels in the last decade, the statute has recently become the focus
of attention.  The enforcement actions brought by the Antitrust
Division have generated significant follow-on private treble dam-
ages actions.  In those private actions, a new class of plaintiff has
emerged—foreign plaintiffs purporting to sue under the U.S. an-
titrust laws for injuries suffered abroad. Defendants have chal-
71 See  F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004); Kruman
v. Christie’s Int’l PLC, 284 F.3d 384 (2d Cir. 2002).
72 434 U.S. 308 (1978).
73 Id . at 313-15, 318-19.
74 Id . at 315.
75 15 U.S.C. § 6a (2000).
76 Id .
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lenged such suits on the grounds that under the FTAIA, the
courts lack subject matter jurisdiction.77  The circuit courts split
on the issue of whether, and the extent to which, the FTAIA bars
claims on foreign transactions by foreign plaintiffs.  The Fifth
Circuit held that such claims are barred unless the plaintiff can
show that the domestic anticompetitive effects caused by the ille-
gal conduct give rise to its claim.78  The Second79 and D.C. Cir-
cuits80 took a more generous approach to foreign claims and held
that under the FTAIA, foreign plaintiffs may sue on a foreign
transaction by showing merely that the conspiratorial conduct
had the requisite effect on U.S. commerce, and that some person
(not necessarily the foreign plaintiff) has a claim arising from the
alleged conduct.81
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Empagran S.A.  in or-
der to resolve the conflict among the circuits regarding the
proper construction of the FTAIA.82  On June 14, 2004, the
Court ruled that the FTAIA barred foreign claimants from re-
covery under the United States’ antitrust laws.83  In reaching that
conclusion, the Court took an unusual path.  Rather than con-
fronting the statutory interpretation issue head-on, the Court re-
lied principally on the doctrine of prescriptive comity under
which courts construe “ambiguous statutes to avoid unreasona-
ble interference with the sovereign authority of other nations.”84
The Court reasoned that application of the United States’ anti-
trust laws to claims by foreign citizens based on foreign transac-
tions would create “a serious risk of interference with a foreign
nation’s ability independently to regulate its own commercial af-
fairs,” and that “the justification for that interference seems in-
substantial.”85  In particular, the Court noted that permitting
foreign plaintiffs to invoke the treble damages remedy under
77 See generally  Edward D. Cavanagh, The FTAIA and Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Over Foreign Transactions Under the Antirust Laws:  The New Frontier in Antitrust
Litigation , 56 S.M.U. L. REV. 2151 (2003) (detailing federal courts’ extraterritorial
jurisdiction in light of the FTAIA).
78 Den Norske Stats Oljeselskap As v. Heeremac Vof, 241 F.3d 420 (5th Cir.
2001), cert. denied , 534 U.S. 1127 (2002).
79 See  Kruman v. Christie’s Int’l PLC, 284 F.3d 384 (2d Cir. 2002).
80 Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoffman-LaRoche, Ltd., 315 F.3d 338 (D.C. Cir. 2003),
vacated , 124 S. Ct. 2359 (2004).
81 Id . at 352.
82 F. Hoffmann-LaRoche, Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 540 U.S. 1088 (2003).
83 Empagran S.A. , 124 S. Ct. at 2366.
84 Id.
85 Id . at 2367.
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U.S. law might supersede the national policy decisions of foreign
governments and at the same time diminish the incentives of for-
eign firms to cooperate with the antitrust regulator in their home
countries.86
In addition, the Court ruled that Congress did not intend to
expand the scope of the Sherman Act as applied to foreign com-
merce when it enacted the FTAIA.87  Neither the history nor the
language of the FTAIA supports the expansive approach that
was proposed by the plaintiffs.88  Nor would pre-FTAIA caselaw
support application of the Sherman Act to the conduct in ques-
tion.89  In so ruling, the Court elided over the complicated statu-
tory interpretation question that had split the circuits.
The Court did, however, leave the courtroom door ajar, if not
wide open, to those foreign plaintiffs who can show that their
injury was “inextricably bound up with . . . domestic restraints of
trade.”90  Thus, the Court suggested that if the foreign plaintiff
can show that the anticompetitive effects in the domestic market
helped bring about the injury suffered by the plaintiffs abroad,
then there is subject matter jurisdiction under the Sherman Act.
Nevertheless, it still appears that the foreign plaintiff would have
to establish that the alleged anticompetitive effect on domestic
commerce gives rise to the claim that the foreign plaintiff asserts.
B. Enforcement of Foreign Antitrust Laws
In the increasingly globalized economy of the twenty-first cen-
tury, businesses must not only be concerned with the United
States’ antitrust laws, but must also be concerned with the anti-
trust laws of other nations.  For nearly a century, the United
States was the most prominent, but by no means the only, cop on
the antitrust beat.  Today, largely due to the example set by the
United States, over 100 nations have credible antitrust regimes in
place.91  Perhaps the regimes of Canada, the EU, Australia, and
86 Id . at 2368.
87 Id . at 2369.
88 Id .
89 Id . at 2369-71.
90 Id . at  2370.
91 See  R. Hewitt Pate, Assistant Attorney General Antitrust Division, The DOJ
International Antitrust Program—Maintaining Momentum, Address Before the An-
titrust Section of the American Bar Association 2003 Forum on International Com-
petition Law (Feb. 6, 2003), available at  http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/ speeches/
200736.htm (last visited June 10, 2005).
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Japan are foremost among these, but virtually all “Westernized”
economies now have some form of antitrust enforcement.
The ubiquitousness of antitrust enforcement on the global
stage has had a profound effect on the business operations of
international companies.  General Electric and Honeywell were
forced to abandon a merger, approved by U.S. authorities, when
regulators in the EU objected to it on antitrust grounds.92
Microsoft, having put the U.S. monopolization action behind it,
was recently fined $615 million for “abuse of dominance” by EU
authorities for the same types of behavior that were the subject
of the U.S. suit.93  In addition, the EU imposed more restrictive
conduct sanctions on Microsoft than had the U.S. courts.94
In sum, the globalization of antitrust has multiplied potential
antitrust risks for international companies.  The emergence of
credible foreign antitrust regimes has led some antitrust critics to
argue for a reexamination of the U.S. role in antitrust enforce-
ment, and a scaling back of antitrust activity in the international
arena by U.S. authorities.
II
WHAT’S WRONG WITH THIS PICTURE?
The United States’ antitrust enforcement apparatus is indeed
formidable.  Critics view the statutory scheme and the enforce-
ment policies executing that scheme as too severe.  They argue
that criminal sanctions, which are felonies and may include fines
of up to twice the unlawful gains to defendants or twice the losses
suffered by the victims, as well as virtually guaranteed jail time
for convicted individuals, may be unduly harsh.95  Critics further
92 Commission Decision of 03/07/2001 declaring a concentration to be incompati-
ble with the common market and the EEA Agreement (Case No COMP/M.2220 –
General Electric/Honeywell) (July 3, 2001) [hereinafter Commission Decision of 03/
07/2001].
93 Commission Decision of 24.03.2004 relating to a proceeding under Article 82 of
the EC Treaty (Case COMP/C-3/37.792 Microsoft) (Mar. 24, 2004) [hereinafter
Commission Decision of 24.03.2004]; see  Paul Meller, EU Issues Strict New Ruling
on Microsoft Record Fine Levied; Decision Could Shape How Business is Done ,
INT’L HERALD TRIB. (Paris), Mar. 25, 2004, at 1.
94 Meller, supra  note 93.
95 See  Tefft W. Smith et al., Finding the Right Price , LEGAL TIMES, Dec. 15, 2003,
at 32 (criticizing legislation raising fines under the Sherman Act in absence of at-
tempts to reform sentencing guidelines); see also  Steven J. Miller, Remarks Before
the Antitrust Section of the American Bar Association Remedies Forum (Apr. 2,
2003) (expressing concern about a “pile on” mentality arising from civil treble dam-
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argue that potential civil treble damages liability, without any
right to contribution or claim reduction on top of already severe
criminal sanctions, amounts to overkill.96  Some question the
continuing need for mandatory treble damages in the civil
realm.97  They urge that the threat of treble damages may chill
behavior that is potentially procompetitive.98  They also argue
that mandatory trebling is inherently unfair because it makes
businesses the targets of trivial suits that they are forced to settle
rather than roll the dice with a jury; especially since in federal
courts, with notice pleading, broad discovery, class actions, and
liberal amendment policies, the cards are stacked against defend-
ants.99  The harshest detractors argue that antitrust is the outmo-
ded creation of a smokestack society, and that in a fast-paced,
high-tech economy antitrust serves only to stifle innovation,
thereby impairing competition.100
While much of the criticism of the current antitrust enforce-
ment scheme emanates from the defense side, would-be defend-
ants are not the only critics of the system.  Federal regulators
have advocated legislation calling for enhanced criminal penal-
ties, including higher fines under the Sherman Act and longer jail
terms for those convicted of antitrust violations.101  Consumers,
especially in the wake of the Microsoft  experience, are con-
cerned that the equitable remedies in the antitrust arsenal are
not sufficiently adaptable in today’s economy to provide mean-
ingful relief from monopolistic behavior.102
ages on top of criminal double damages), available at  www.abanet.org/antitrust/rem-
edies/roundtable1.doc (last visited June 12, 2005).
96 See generally  Edward D. Cavanagh, Detrebling Antitrust Damages:  An Idea
Whose Time Has Come? , 61 TUL. L. REV. 777, 791-820 (1987) (detailing the criti-
cisms of mandatory trebling).
97 See  Breit & Elzinga, supra  note 5, at 405-06.
98 See id . at 428-32; see also RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW:  AN ECO-
NOMIC PERSPECTIVE 231 (1976); Frank H. Easterbrook, Detrebling Antitrust Dam-
ages , 28 J.L. & ECON. 445, 456-57 (1985).
99 See POSNER, supra  note 98, at 228; see  also PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW:  AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND
THEIR APPLICATION ¶ 3306 (2d ed. 2000) (“[T]rebling encourages more marginal
cases to be brought, and under more creative theories of liability.”).
100 See Consumer Group Advises Congress Not to Ignore DOJ’s Attempts to Stifle
Innovation and Competition , FREEDOMWORKS, Feb. 25, 1999, at 1 (expressing the
view that the Justice Department’s action against Microsoft is harming consumers by
chilling innovation), available at  http://www.cse.org/newsroom/press_template.
php?press_id=151 (last visited June 10, 2005).
101 See  Pate, supra  note 4.
102 See  Lyle Denniston, Judge Backs Microsoft Settlement , BOSTON GLOBE, Nov.
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Set forth below is an analysis of these concerns.
A. Criminal Enforcement
1. Criminal Penalties
As discussed above,103 violations of the Sherman Act may be
criminally prosecuted.  Although government prosecutors have
been circumspect in exercising criminal powers, criminal prose-
cution has historically played an important role in the Antitrust
Division’s enforcement policy.  During the Reagan years, the
Antitrust Division initiated criminal proceedings aggressively,
and in heretofore unprecedented numbers, under the auspices of
William Baxter.104  Baxter’s enforcement policies marked an ab-
rupt departure from the policies of earlier administrations.  De-
fendants prosecuted during his tenure were not the Fortune 500
companies that had been targeted by his predecessors, but rather
small contractors or suppliers accused of bid-rigging in road
building and government procurement contracts.  Critics have
charged that the Reagan-era Antitrust Division pursued criminal
cases to the exclusion of civil enforcement.105 While it would be
inaccurate to say that there was no civil enforcement during the
Reagan years, it is fair to say that civil enforcement was not a
priority.
Subsequent administrations have pursued a more balanced
docket as between civil and criminal cases,106 but criminal en-
forcement remains the cornerstone of the Antitrust Division’s
enforcement policy.107 With the advent of economic globaliza-
tion, recent administrations have adopted a more international
focus in pursuing their enforcement agenda.108  As a result, the
Antitrust Division in recent years has successfully prosecuted in-
ternational cartels in auction services, food additives and vita-
mins, among others, and continues to devote significant
resources to investigations involving price-fixing in the interna-
2, 2002, at A1; Paul Roberts, Consumer Groups Intervene in Microsoft Settlement ,
INFOWORLD DAILY NEWS, Jan. 3, 2003, available at  http://www.infoworld. com/arti-
cles/hn/xml/03/01/03/030103hnintervene.html?s=IDGNS.
103 See supra  notes 12-17 and accompanying text.
104 See  Kovacic, supra  note 52, at 437-42.
105 See  Pitofsky, supra  note 52, at 585.
106 See id.  at 585-86.
107 See  Pate, supra  note 91 (describing how prosecuting international cartels crim-
inally is a “core mission” of the Antitrust Division).
108 Id .
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tional arena.109
To enhance criminal enforcement, the Antitrust Division has
supported recently enacted legislation that will (1) increase crim-
inal fines under the Sherman Act, and (2) provide longer jail
terms for those convicted of Sherman Act offenses.110  The legis-
lation will raise the statutory fine for corporations from $10 mil-
lion to $100 million, increase the $350,000 maximum for
individuals to $1 million, and increase the maximum jail sentence
from up to three years to up to ten years.111
The rationale for increasing corporate fines under the Sherman
Act is that the current maximum has not kept pace with the mag-
nitude of contemporary antitrust price-fixing conspiracies.112  In
addition, higher penalties under the Sherman Act would provide
the government with more flexibility at the sentencing phase of a
case and relieve it of the substantial burden of proving the dollar
amount of either twice the gain to the perpetrators or twice the
loss to the victims of the antitrust violation.113  In light of the
global scope of recently prosecuted cartels, the increase in the
statutory fine proposed seems modest and unobjectionable.
Whether the increase will have the desired effect of enhancing
deterrence is unclear.114
The rationale for increased jail time for convicted individuals is
the same as that for increasing statutory fines for convicted cor-
porations—the need for the sentence to reflect the magnitude of
the wrongdoing.  Moreover, proponents of increased jail time
point out that the three-year maximum sentence for antitrust vio-
lations was among the shortest for white-collar crime, and is far
less than the twenty-year maximum prescribed for white-collar
109 Id .
110 Pub. L. No. 108-237, §§ 102-201, 118 Stat. 661, 661-670 (2004) (codified in scat-
tered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
111 Id.  § 215, 118 Stat. at 668.
112 See  Pate, supra  note 4, at 3.
113 Id .
114 See  Donald C. Klawiter, After the Deluge:  The Powerful Effect of Substantial
Criminal Fines, Imprisonment, and Other Penalties in the Age of International Cartel
Enforcement , 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 745, 758 n.79 (2001) (noting the absence of
any consensus regarding “the impact of severe monetary penalties in deterring ille-
gal conduct”); see also  Michael L. Denger, Too Much or Too Little, Remarks before
the Antitrust Section of the American Bar Association Remedies Forum, at 4-5
(Apr. 3, 2003) (questioning the deterrent effect of criminal fines because “most car-
tel participants don’t think they’ll get caught”), available at  http://www. abanet.org/
antitrust/remedies/remediesintro.doc (last visited June 14, 2005).
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fraud under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.115  However, the case for
more jail time is less persuasive.  Although the Sherman Act has
always carried criminal sanctions, jail time has not historically
been imposed.  Originally, criminal convictions under the Sher-
man Act carried only misdemeanor penalties which included a
fine of up to $5,000 and imprisonment for up to one year.116 Jail
time was almost unheard of until the 1960s when a number of
executives in the Electrical Equipment  cases were sentenced to
thirty days in prison.117 Still, it was not until the 1970s that jail
time for antitrust violations became a common occurrence,
largely because of two events.  First, in 1974, Congress enacted
the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act which amended the
Sherman Act to make antitrust violations a felony punishable by
up to three years of jail time.118  Second, in 1977, the Antitrust
Division promulgated Guidelines for Sentencing Recommenda-
tions in Felony Cases under the Sherman Act.119  The Guidelines
expressed the view that prison sentences for egregious restraints
of trade are essential because they are uniquely effective in de-
terring antitrust violators (who generally are white-collar busi-
nessmen) who may view a fine as a “license fee” for fixing prices,
but who view the threat of a substantial prison term more
seriously.120
In succeeding years, the Antitrust Division has continued to
press for mandatory jail time for Sherman Act offenders.  The
question is whether longer jail terms are needed.  There is gen-
eral agreement that the likelihood—indeed, the certainty—of
some jail time, if an antitrust violator is apprehended and con-
victed, serves a valuable deterrent function.  Less clear is
whether deterrence is measurably increased by increasing jail
time.  Empirical research addressing this question is sparse.  Real
life experience casts doubt on the premise.  Arguably, it is prison
itself, not the length  of the prison term, that creates the deterrent
effect.  More importantly, increasing the severity of jail sentences
may discourage other nations from cooperative-enforcement ef-
115 See generally  Klawiter, supra  note 114, at 758 & n.79.
116 2 EARL W. KINTNER, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW § 9.5 (1980).
117 MILTON HANDLER ET AL., TRADE REGULATION 51 (4th ed. 1997).
118 Antitrust Penalties and Procedures Act, Pub. L. No. 93-528, 88 Stat. 1706
(1974) (codified in 15 U.S.C. § 16).
119 U.S. Dep’t of Justice Antitrust Div., Sentencing in Antitrust Felony Cases , in  4
Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 13,115, at 20,649-23 (Aug. 16, 1994).
120 See id . ¶ 13,115, at 20,649-24.
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forts.  Criminal sanctions for antitrust violations, while not un-
known outside the United States, are rare.  The existence of
criminal sanctions had made some nations hesitant to assist the
United States even before the new legislation.  Increasing jail
time is likely to further discourage assistance to the United States
in the international arena.
2. Leniency Program
In 1978, under the aegis of John H. Shenefield, the Antitrust
Division inaugurated a leniency program under which antitrust
violators could escape criminal prosecution if they reported crim-
inal activity to the Antitrust Division prior to the commencement
of an investigation.121  Any amnesty grant was discretionary with
the Antitrust Division.122  The purpose of the program was to
reward entities who uncovered criminal activity for the Antitrust
Division by not prosecuting them. While the program had some
initial success, over time, it had fewer and fewer takers.  In 1993,
the leniency program was revised to make cooperation with the
government easier and more inviting by: (1) making amnesty a
matter of right if the conduct is reported prior to the commence-
ment of any investigation; (2) permitting amnesty to be had even
if cooperation begins after an investigation starts; and (3) pro-
tecting from prosecution all officers, directors, and employees of
a company seeking amnesty, provided that they cooperate with
authorities.123
The revised amnesty policy had a sudden and dramatic impact
on antitrust enforcement.  Amnesty applications surged and led
directly to a series of criminal prosecutions that generated record
fines.124  Not surprisingly, the Antitrust Division views the Am-
nesty Program as a key element of its criminal enforcement pol-
icy.125  So important is the Amnesty Program, that the Antitrust
Division has taken steps to strengthen it by actively supporting
recently enacted legislation that provides that parties who are
granted amnesty and are subsequently sued in follow-on treble
damages actions would be liable only for single damages, and
121 U.S. Dep’t of Justice Antitrust Div., Prosecutorial Amnesty—“Whistleblowing
Conspirators,” in  4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 13,112, at 20,649-21 (Aug. 16, 1994).
122 Id .
123 U.S. Dep’t of Justice Antitrust Div., supra  note 18, ¶ 13,113, at 20,629-21 to
20,629-22; Hammond, supra  note 21.
124 Hammond, supra  note 21.
125 Id .
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only for the overcharges actually imposed; i.e., they would not be
subject to joint and several liability.126  This legislation was
driven by the concern that the specter of treble damages in fol-
low-on civil actions dissuades conspirators from cooperating with
the government and availing themselves of the benefits of the
Amnesty Program.
Unquestionably, the legislation strengthens the Amnesty Pro-
gram by eliminating significant financial disincentives for partici-
pation by antitrust violators.  Nevertheless, important questions
remain as to whether this legislation: (1) is needed; and (2) will
adversely impact private enforcement.
The need for this legislation is questionable.  First, as is
demonstrated by the large number of leniency applications, ex-
isting incentives to seek leniency are powerful and are working.
Concerns that potential treble damages may discourage partici-
pation may well be overblown.  Once the government has suc-
cessfully prosecuted a criminal antitrust conspiracy, whether by
trial or by plea agreement, the results in the civil realm are by
and large preordained—defendants will be held liable and the
only question is how much they will pay in damages.  Given this
reality, defendants will settle the follow-on civil actions.  Those
settlements tend to mirror actual  damages, not treble  damages.
Moreover, the absence of a statutory right to contribution can be,
and typically is, remedied by a sharing agreement among defend-
ants.  Accordingly, concerns that potential civil treble damage li-
ability down the road chills participation in the leniency program
appear more theoretical than real.
Second, the proposal may adversely affect private enforce-
ment.  As matters now stand, the criminal and civil phases of a
conspiracy case proceed on separate tracks.  The criminal action
does not in any way foreclose the civil action, but may help the
civil action if a conviction is obtained.  The legislation would put
significant limits on the monetary relief that private plaintiffs
could obtain.  The question is whether it is wise as a policy matter
to permit discretionary prosecutorial decisions made by the Anti-
trust Division to preempt, or at least limit, private remedies.
One can argue that the restrictions placed on private actions by
the legislation are limited and will not prevent private plaintiffs
from obtaining full recovery from other defendants.  Moreover,
126 Pub. L. No. 108-237, §§ 102-201, 118 Stat. 661, 661-670 (2004) (codified in scat-
tered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
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as previously noted, the civil cases are more likely to settle for an
amount that approximates actual damages rather than treble
damages.  Still, altering the long-existing antitrust enforcement
scheme to favor criminal over civil actions and government en-
forcement over private enforcement is disquieting.  Fortunately,
the bill contains a five-year sunset provision,127 and, presumably,
the law will not be renewed if there is a demonstrably negative
effect on private enforcement during that five-year period.
B. Treble Damages
1. Mandatory Trebling
From their inception, the antitrust laws have provided for a
private remedy that awarded successful plaintiffs mandatory
treble damages.128  The rationale for mandatory trebling is four-
fold: (1) compensation; (2) deterrence; (3) punishment; and (4)
disgorgement of ill-gotten gains.129  Few would argue that com-
pensation, deterrence, punishment, and disgorgement are proper
goals of antitrust enforcement, but increasing numbers of critics
are questioning whether mandatory trebling is essential to
achieve these goals.  The discussion below will examine the con-
temporary criticisms of mandatory trebling and discuss whether
these criticisms call for elimination or modification of the current
rule.
a. Compensation
From a compensation perspective, mandatory trebling serves
to assure antitrust plaintiffs that they will fully recover any losses
sustained by reason of any antitrust violations.  Trebling is appro-
priate in horizontal conspiracy cases affecting price because the
generally accepted measure of damages in those cases—
overcharges, that is, the price actually paid less the price that
would have prevailed but for the conspiracy—fails to measure
the total harm suffered by the victims.  For example, overcharges
do not include lost opportunity costs.  Nor do overcharges remu-
nerate business entities for losses caused by diversion of com-
pany executives from their normal responsibilities and by other
organizational disruptions necessitated by an antitrust suit.
127 § 211, 118 Stat. at 666.
128 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2000).
129 See generally  Cavanagh, supra  note 96, at 786-88 (comparing the goals and
effects of mandatory trebling).
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More importantly, overcharges do not include the victim’s
share of the deadweight loss to society resulting from horizontal
conspiracies.  Trebling may also provide a rough approximation
of actual damages in exclusion cases and group boycott cases,
where lost profits are the accepted measure of damages, given
that many illegal schemes so dislocate the market that it is nearly
impossible to measure the true damages inflicted by the anticom-
petitive conduct.  More than that, trebling provides plaintiffs with
strong incentives to undertake the complex, lengthy, and expen-
sive task of uncovering and successfully prosecuting antitrust vio-
lations.  Finally, mandatory trebling may facilitate settlements in
antitrust suits in amounts that roughly approximate actual
damages.130
b. Deterrence
Mandatory trebling serves to deter antitrust violations.  When-
ever a prospective antitrust defendant is faced with a realistic
likelihood of being forced to pay three times the actual damages
that its risky conduct may cause, it will think twice about engag-
ing in such conduct.  The hard question is whether mandatory
trebling provides the appropriate level of deterrence.  From an
economic perspective, the appropriate deterrent level turns on
the likelihood that objectionable conduct will be detected.131  Be-
cause many antitrust violations are concealed, including price-fix-
ing, division of markets, and group boycotts, there is a
reasonable likelihood that the offending conduct may go unde-
tected.  If the likelihood of being caught is one in two, then
double damages provide the appropriate deterrent.132  If the
chances of successful prosecution are one in ten, then damages
amounting to ten times the actual damages would be optimal
from the economist’s perspective.  Mandatory trebling would
thus be optimal when the chances of detection are one in three.
Accordingly, mandatory trebling may under-deter in those cases
where illegality is well concealed, which is frequently the case in
horizontal price-fixing actions.133 Put another way, the appropri-
130 See generally  Robert H. Lande, Are Antitrust “Treble” Damages Really Single
Damages? , 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 115, 119 (1993) (noting that mandatory trebling often
results in costs equal to the actual damages).
131 See  Easterbrook, supra  note 98, at 454-58 (discussing the effects of con-
cealability in trebling).
132 Id . at 455.
133 Id . at 455-56.
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ate level of deterrence in horizontal price-fixing cases may be
double or even triple treble damages.
On the other hand, critics argue that mandatory trebling over
deters in those antitrust cases where damages are subject for al-
legedly unlawful conduct that is not  concealed, such as tying, ex-
clusive dealing, and monopolistic overcharges.134  Critics assert
that the consequence of mandatory trebling in these types of
cases is to chill conduct that is procompetitive, and thus lawful,
out of fear that this lawful behavior may be prosecuted and even-
tually punished.  Nevertheless, it would be impracticable, if not
impossible, to set damages multiples based on the likelihood that
differing antitrust violations will be detected and successfully
prosecuted.  Accordingly, as is the case with compensation, treb-
ling provides a kind of rough measure of the optimal level of
deterrence in antitrust cases.
c. Punishment
Mandatory treble damages also serve to punish antitrust viola-
tors.  Punishment occurs by definition whenever a defendant is
ordered to pay an amount in excess of actual damages suffered
by the plaintiff.  Although few have historically questioned the
punitive function of mandatory trebling, critics have recently ar-
gued that mandatory trebling may be unfairly punitive in cases
where the private action is preceded by a criminal conviction and
the defendant is fined under the alternative sentencing provisions
in an amount equal to twice the gain derived from the illegal con-
duct or twice the loss incurred by the victim.  As discussed be-
low,135 criminal fines under the Sherman Act have historically
been low—until recently, a maximum of $10 million for corpora-
tions and $350,000 for individuals.  The alternative sentencing
procedures, enacted in 1984, gave the courts greater latitude in
sentencing and dramatically increased the potential monetary
penalties for criminal antitrust violations.136  Nevertheless, piling
civil treble damages on top of criminal double damages may be
viewed as draconian and unnecessarily punitive.
d. Disgorgement of Ill-Gotten Gains
Finally, mandatory trebling assures that a defendant will not be
134 See  Cavanagh, supra  note 96, at 831-32.
135 See supra  notes 14-17 and accompanying text.
136 18 U.S.C. § 3571(d) (2000).
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able to benefit monetarily from its wrongdoing.137  Even if all of
the victims of antitrust wrongdoing do not come forward to claim
their rightful share of damages, antitrust violators are still denied
the fruits of their bad conduct by virtue of the mandatory treb-
ling rule.  In theory, trebling is not necessary to assure disgorge-
ment of ill-gotten gains because plaintiffs’ actual  claimed losses
would presumably correspond to defendants’ actual  illicit gains.
However, the reality is that plaintiffs are unlikely to undertake
the arduous task of prosecuting a civil antitrust claim if their re-
covery is limited to actual damages.  Without trebling, therefore,
antitrust violators may not be sued and may well be able to reap
the benefits of their illegal conduct.
On the other hand, mandatory trebling may again present a
problem of overkill, at least in those cases where there has been
a prior criminal conviction and defendants have been fined in the
amount of twice the gain or twice the loss caused by their unlaw-
ful acts.  If the criminal penalty itself assures disgorgement, query
whether enhanced damages in subsequent civil actions are neces-
sary or even desirable to assure further disgorgement.
2. Is Mandatory Trebling Still Desirable?
The foregoing discussion demonstrates that in the 115-year his-
tory of the antitrust laws sufficient doubt has been raised regard-
ing the continuing viability of the four-prong rationale for
mandatory trebling so as to warrant its reexamination.
As a threshold matter, it is clear that treble damages are not
necessary in every civil antitrust case.  For example, in cases
where conduct is open, as opposed to covert, trebling is not nec-
essary from a deterrence perspective in order to take account of
those similar cases that may go undetected.  In these cases, as
with tort cases generally, recovery of actual damages should
serve as a sufficient incentive to bring suit.  Similarly, disgorge-
ment could be achieved through an action for actual damages.
Nor would punishment be appropriate if the alleged unlawful
conduct were open rather than covert.  On the other hand,
mandatory trebling is still clearly appropriate in cases involving
clandestine horizontal-price-fixing schemes because: (1) covert
behavior is difficult to detect; (2) at least some covert schemes
are likely to fly under the radar of even very vigilant enforcers;
137 Blue Shield of Virginia v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 472-73 (1982) (explaining
that a private remedy serves to deprive wrongdoers of their ill-gotten gains).
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and (3) cartel behavior creates deadweight economic loss to soci-
ety.  Indeed, trebling may not achieve optimal deterrence if more
than one in three price-fixing conspiracies go undetected.  Treb-
ling is also necessary in covert cases from a compensation per-
spective because conspiracies wreak havoc on the market and
make it difficult to re-create how competitive forces would have
interacted but for the conspiracy.
Given that trebling is not necessary in every case, but still a
crucial element of certain types of antitrust cases, the question is
whether the current treble damages scheme should be modified.
At the outset, it should be noted that the current remedial
scheme does not mandate treble damages in all cases because
Congress has selectively chosen to detreble damages in certain
cases.  For example, antitrust liability arising out of joint research
and production ventures, whose participants have notified the
Antitrust Division of their existence, are subject only to actual
damages in the event a violation is found.138  Municipalities
found to have violated the antitrust laws are not subject to dam-
ages but rather only to injunctive relief.139  Legislation recently
passed by Congress provides that parties participating in the An-
titrust Division’s Amnesty Program are liable only for actual
damages.140  In addition, that same legislation limits monetary re-
lief against standard-setting organizations to actual damages.141
The discussion below will focus on whether it would be desira-
ble to maintain the status quo or to adopt alternative approaches,
including (a) detrebling in all antitrust cases, (b) selective de-
trebling, or (c) abolishing mandatory trebling but authorizing im-
position of up to treble damages in the discretion of the court.
a. Detrebling Across the Board
Whatever the theoretical justification for elimination of treble
damages across the board in antitrust cases, this approach is a
non-starter as a practical matter.  Given the long history of treble
damages, coupled with the potentially devastating effect of cartel
behavior on consumers, it would be political suicide for a legisla-
tor to advocate an end to trebling in antitrust cases.  Moreover,
the fact that cartels—even in the face of treble damages—still try
138 15 U.S.C. § 4301 (2000).
139 See id . §§ 34-36.
140 Pub. L. No. 108-237, §§ 212-221, 118 Stat. 661, 666-69 (2004).
141 Id.  § 213, 118 Stat. at 666.
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\84-1\ORE103.txt unknown Seq: 28 31-OCT-05 11:51
174 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84, 2005]
to get away with price-fixing strongly suggests that elimination of
treble damages would wreak havoc on the deterrent function of
antitrust.  Advocates of this position are far outside the main-
stream of antitrust thought.  However, a proposal that would
abolish treble damages but require prejudgment interest to be
awarded in antitrust cases has received serious attention in anti-
trust circles.142  Proponents argue that this approach would bring
antitrust into the mainstream of tort law and would eliminate the
worst features of mandatory trebling, namely, undeserved wind-
falls to plaintiffs and their attorneys and overdeterrence, while
still preserving incentives to sue under the antitrust laws.  Plain-
tiffs would be assured a recovery in excess of actual damages and
in some cases the awards calculated on actual damages plus pre-
judgment interest would exceed treble damages.  Defendants fac-
ing potential liability for prejudgment interest would have strong
incentives to enter into meaningful settlement negotiations ear-
lier, rather than later, in the litigation.
While this approach, particularly its party-neutral aspect, is in-
triguing, substituting prejudgment interest for trebling does not
offer a clear improvement over the present system.  First, calcula-
tion of prejudgment interest would be enormously complicated,
far more complicated than simple trebling.  For this reason alone,
a prejudgment interest rule in lieu of treble damages could also
lengthen proceedings and make antitrust litigation more costly.
Second, use of prejudgment interest would create greater uncer-
tainty as to ultimate liability in dollars, while trebling provides
much greater certainty.  Moreover, to the extent that this propo-
sal would generate greater dollar recoveries for plaintiffs than
those available under mandatory trebling, overdeterrence re-
mains an issue.  Third, as a corollary to point two, increased un-
certainty may impair the parties’ abilities to reach a settlement.
Fourth, substituting a rate or rates of interest for trebling would
appear no less arbitrary than the present system of mandatory
trebling.  At the end of the day, the prejudgment interest ap-
proach does not provide a clear improvement over the present
system.
142 The prejudgment interest issue has been debated at length by the ABA Anti-
trust Section Civil Remedies Task Force.
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b. Selective Detrebling
As discussed above,143 Congress has already engaged in selec-
tive detrebling and may continue to do so.  The question for dis-
cussion here is whether a piecemeal approach to detrebling is
preferable to a comprehensive policy on detrebling.  As a general
rule, comprehensive policies are preferable to those adopted
piecemeal.  This is particularly true in antitrust, especially since
Congress has detrebled certain conduct and will now face signifi-
cant lobbying from additional groups seeking immunity from
mandatory trebling.
Yet, designing a comprehensive detrebling policy is easier said
than done.  Especially difficult is the question of where to draw
the line between trebling and actual damages.  One approach is
to allow treble damages in per se cases but not in non-per se
cases.144  The underlying rationale of this view—that trebling
should be reserved for egregious cases—is sound.  However,
practical application of such a rule would be difficult because
there is no sharp divide between per se and non-per se cases.145
Indeed, it appears from the line of Supreme Court cases culmi-
nating in California Dental Ass’n  that the dividing line is in a
state of flux.146  Accordingly, making treble damages turn on
whether the defendants’ acts are per se illegal is likely to gener-
ate more confusion than certainty.  Moreover, the per se/non-per
se distinction is troublesome on the merits because substantial
harm to competition can result from conduct that is traditionally
viewed as falling on the “Rule of Reason” side of the liability
spectrum.147
A second approach would reserve trebling for conduct that is
covert and detreble allegedly unlawful conduct that is open and
notorious.148  The rationale for this view is that where unlawful
conduct is concealed, which is typically the case where price-fix-
ing is involved, the unlawful conduct is not certain to be discov-
ered and successfully prosecuted.149  The subsidy of treble
143 See supra  notes 138-41 and accompanying text.
144 See generally  Cavanagh, supra  note 96, at 824-29 (discussing the reasoning be-
hind the per se  distinction in trebling).
145 See id.  at 826-27.
146 See  Cal. Dental Ass’n v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 526 U.S. 756, 769-79 (1999).
147 See  Cavanagh, supra  note 96, at 824-29.
148 See  Easterbrook, supra  note 98, at 454-58 (discussing concealability as a
proper foundation for trebling).
149 Id .
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damages encourages antitrust victims to ferret out and prosecute
covert illegal conduct.  Trebling also provides significant incen-
tives for prospective antitrust violators to refrain from their ille-
gal conduct.  At the same time, where the acts in question are
open and not concealed, the incentives provided by mandatory
trebling are arguably unnecessary.  Detection and successful
prosecution of such open conduct is far more likely than in the
case of covert activity, and the near certainty of being caught
would be ample incentive for the antitrust violator to refrain
from illegal conduct.  Equally important, the cost of detection is
minimal where conduct is not concealed.  Accordingly, trebling is
less justifiable in the case of overt, as opposed to covert, acts.
As with the first option, this second approach suffers from lack
of certainty and predictability.  Unlawful antitrust schemes typi-
cally involve a mix of overt and covert activities.  Bid-rigging is a
prime example of this phenomenon.  Courts should not let price
fixers off the hook for treble damages by permitting them to ar-
gue that their activities were open.  The courts have long rejected
attempts by defendants to defeat antitrust liability through proof
that the Antitrust Division or other government agencies were
aware of the alleged conduct and did not take immediate steps to
challenge that conduct.150  Moreover, actual damages may not
provide an accurate measure of the economic harm caused by
antitrust violations that are open and notorious.  Conspiratorial
behaviors, particularly conspiracies affecting price, not only force
victims to pay overcharges but also create a deadweight loss to
society for which the victims are not directly compensated.  Per-
mitting antitrust violators to avoid treble damages by the simple
expediency of “going public” with their behavior is unsound be-
cause limiting plaintiffs to actual damages would exclude losses
due to allocable inefficiency resulting from defendants’ conduct.
A third approach would permit treble damages where prior
criminal actions by the government have been successfully prose-
cuted.  This approach is beneficial in that it would assure that
trebling would occur only in cases involving truly egregious con-
duct.  On the downside, this approach may prove to be underin-
clusive and may end up excluding cases where treble damages
150 See, e.g. , American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377, 411
(1921) (demonstrating how a trade association’s forwarding of information gathered
in its data sharing program to the Department of Justice does not immunize the
conduct).
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would be appropriate.  The criminal remedy is discretionary with
the Antitrust Division.  If the government declines to proceed in
a case or prosecutes a case civilly, private litigants would be de-
nied the treble damages remedy, even in cases where the conduct
is arguably egregious.  Thus, the Antitrust Division’s exercise of
prosecutorial discretion would have a preemptive effect on reme-
dies available to the private bar.
This third approach is also troublesome from another perspec-
tive.  As discussed above,151 a major criticism of antitrust reme-
dies has been the potential catastrophic effect of piling civil
treble damages on top of criminal fines that are based on twice
the loss to victims or twice the gain to antitrust violators.  If that
criticism is valid, it would be totally undetermined by a remedies
scheme that would allow trebling only where there has been a
prior criminal conviction.  Indeed, that criticism suggests that
damages in civil follow-on litigation should be detrebled.
Equally important, given the benefits that inure to private liti-
gants in the wake of a successful criminal antitrust prosecution,
including collateral estoppel and admission of guilty pleas into
evidence, it is questionable whether trebling is a necessary incen-
tive for a private follow-on action.
A fourth avenue would be to detreble in those cases where the
defendant has no reason to believe that its conduct is illegal.152
The justification here is that trebling is unduly harsh in cases of
first impression, as well as in cases where (1) liability is based on
a change in prior law upon which a defendant has relied; (2) lia-
bility is found, notwithstanding judicial authority in other juris-
dictions finding the conduct lawful; and (3) liability is predicated
on a novel theory.153
The Achilles’ heel of this approach is the difficulty and the cost
of formulating meaningful objective standards for liability.154  It
is conceivable that in nearly every antitrust case a defendant
would seek to characterize the liability theories as novel or as
matters of first impression.  While intriguing, this proposal does
not appear to offer significant improvement over the present
system.
151 See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
152 See, e.g. , New York State Bar Association, Report of Antitrust Section Commit-
tee on Legislation , 54 N.Y. ST. B.J. 395, 396 (Oct. 1982).
153 See  Cavanagh, supra  note 96, at 830-31.
154 Id .
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c.  Discretionary Detrebling
None of the foregoing proposals for selective detrebling is
ideal.  Each brings its own baggage.  An alternative to selective
detrebling would be to abolish mandatory  treble damages but to
permit courts in the exercise of their sound discretion to award
up to treble the amount of actual damages.155  The rationale un-
derlying discretionary trebling is to eliminate the perceived
harshness and arbitrariness of mandatory trebling and to permit
courts to more effectively tailor civil remedies to the wrongs
committed.  The Antitrust and Trade Regulation Committee of
the Association of the Bar of the City of New York has proposed
that in exercising discretion, the courts should take into account:
(1) the willfulness of the violation; (2) whether a reasonably well-
informed person should have known that the conduct was illegal;
(3) whether the illegal restraint gave rise to some societal benefit
or whether it was the kind of naked restraint of trade which has
traditionally been condemned by the per se rule; (4) the length
of time the illegal acts were committed; (5) whether the conduct
was engaged in openly or whether efforts were made to keep the
conduct secret; (6) the scope of the illegal activity; (7) the bene-
fits derived by the defendants from the illegal activity; and (8)
the impact of increased damages on the defendant’s business.156
The strongest case for trebling on a discretionary basis would
be against defendants involved in a long-term clandestine con-
spiracy affecting price and impacting a broad segment of the
economy, where the defendants have adequate funds to pay en-
hanced damages and a prior history of antitrust violations.  The
case for trebling grows progressively weaker to the extent that
the conduct falls outside the traditionally narrow per se category
and generates tangible economic benefits to consumers.
The discretionary approach is not without a significant poten-
tial downside.  First, under a discretionary regime, trebling itself
will become an issue in every case.  Courts will have to consider
additional proof, including expert proof, much of which is likely
to be tested by preclusive Daubert  motions.157  Antitrust cases
155 See id.  at 838-41.
156 Id.  at 838-39 (citing Antitrust & Trade Regulation Comm’n  of the Ass’n of the
Bar of the City of New York, Report on Treble Damages , 40 THE REC. 647, 669-70
(1985)).
157 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (requiring the trial
court to act as gatekeeper to separate out probative expert evidence from junk
science).
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will become even more costly, lengthy, and complicated.  In
short, damages issues will become the principal focus of the anti-
trust action, which is precisely opposite the current state of af-
fairs.  Recognizing that antitrust violations may so dislocate the
marketplace as to make damages difficult to prove, courts have
historically afforded plaintiffs leeway in proving damages, al-
lowing for reasonable estimates once liability has been estab-
lished.158  A rule of discretionary trebling may result in the tail of
damages wagging the dog of antitrust liability.
Second, discretionary trebling will make it more difficult for
the parties to predict damages with any degree of certainty.  In
turn, uncertainty in assessing damages hinders attempts to reach
settlements.  Thus, a rule of discretionary trebling could lead to
more, not fewer, antitrust trials.
Third, by entrusting the trebling decision to the sound discre-
tion of the court, there is a danger that damages decisions may
turn on individual judges’ subjective attitudes toward antitrust
cases, not on the merits of the particular claims before the court.
Federal judges undergo an arduous screening process prior to
confirmation to a post which provides lifetime tenure in good
conduct.  The process is designed to assure the appointment of
jurists with good judgment.  Still, the human factor cannot be
ignored.
Equally important, precisely because judges will be deciding
antitrust issues on a case-by-case basis, it is likely that, at least
initially, there will be significant variation in the decisions on
trebling issues.  It may take years to forge a consensus on these
issues as the cases percolate up through the appellate process.  In
the meantime, the parties will face uncertainty on significant
damages issues.
Finally, merely vesting courts with discretionary powers does
not guarantee that those powers will be exercised.  In the tort
area, there has been much criticism of what many view as exces-
sive awards to plaintiffs in personal injury cases.  That criticism
has given rise to a tort reform movement advocating for damage
caps in such cases.159  However, judges at both the federal and
158 See, e.g. , Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555,
561 (1931) (“[W]hile the damages may not be determined by mere speculation or
guess, it will be enough if the evidence show the extent of the damages as a matter of
just and reasonable inference, although the result be only approximate.”).
159 See, e.g. , JOINT ECON. COMM’N STUDY, IMPROVING THE AMERICAN LEGAL
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state levels have broad power of remittitur to reduce excessive
jury verdicts.  Were the courts diligently to exercise the power of
remittitur, there would be no need for “tort reform.”  The simple
fact is that courts are reluctant to limit jury verdicts.  A similar
risk exists in antitrust cases under discretionary trebling.  Judges
may simply be content to enter judgment on verdicts awarding
actual damages without giving further consideration to factors
that would support trebling.  All the potential benefits of discre-
tionary trebling would be lost if the courts decline to utilize their
powers.
In the final analysis, discretionary trebling introduces an array
of issues that are not present under current law, raising the possi-
bility that the cure may be worse than the ill.  The case for elimi-
nating mandatory trebling has not been made.
C. Equitable Remedies
In the equitable realm, there is good news and bad news.  The
good news is in the area of merger enforcement, where the Anti-
trust Division and the FTC have screened tens of thousands of
mergers, approving the overwhelming majority.  But where a
given merger threatens competition, the agencies have used the
consent decree process to eliminate anticompetitive aspects of
the deal while permitting the underlying transaction to move for-
ward.  Where settlements could not be reached, the agencies
have sued to enjoin mergers that they view as anticompetitive.160
In the rare instances where the merging parties have declined to
make the premerger notifications requested by the agencies, the
government has gone to court to impose sanctions.
The bad news stems from the use of equitable remedies to alle-
viate the anticompetitive effects caused by monopolization.  As
Microsoft161 illustrates, application of traditional equitable reme-
dies to fast-paced, high-tech industries is no easy task.  Critics of
antitrust have suggested that antitrust principles may no longer
be relevant in the twenty-first-century marketplace.162  That posi-
tion is extreme.  Still, the fact that the Supreme Court has not
SYSTEM: THE ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF TORT REFORM (1996), available at  http://
www.house.gov/jec/tort/tort/tort.htm (last visited June 15, 2005).
160 See  Fed. Trade Comm’n v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Fed.
Trade Comm’n v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066 (D.D.C. 1997).
161 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 59 (D.D.C. 2000), aff’d in
part, rev’d in part , 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001), and cert. denied , 534 U.S. 952 (2001).
162 See infra  note 176 and accompanying text.
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ordered dissolution of a company in nearly forty years under-
scores the need to reexamine equitable relief in monopolization
cases.
1. Mergers
The enactment of the HSR legislation in 1976,163 coupled with
the promulgation of the Justice Department’s Merger Guidelines
in 1982, revolutionized merger practice.  As a result of these two
events: (a) the government received notification of contemplated
mergers of any significant size prior to consummation; (b) the
process for analyzing mergers became more transparent and the
results more predictable for parties to the merger; (c) the vast
majority of transactions have been cleared by the government;
(d) disputes have been resolved administratively through consent
decrees in those cases where anticompetitive potential existed;
and (e) litigation has been infrequent and a tool of last resort.
a. Premerger Notification
The HSR premerger filing requirements and thirty-day notice
period afford the government an opportunity to analyze the po-
tential anticompetitive effects of a merger prior to its consumma-
tion.164  If the transaction as a whole raises anticompetitive
concerns, the government can challenge it in court before the
parties incur the considerable costs of integration.  If the transac-
tion is objectionable in part, the government can identify steps
that would remedy potential anticompetitive effects—typically,
sale of identified assets to third parties—and permit the underly-
ing transaction to go through after the parties have addressed the
government’s objections.  Thus, the HSR scheme provides the
government significant flexibility in regulating mergers but also
allows mergers to be consummated without significant risk of liti-
gation after the fact.
Prior to the HSR, the government’s options in merger control
were limited.  Premerger filings were not required, and there was
no mandatory waiting period.  Proposed mergers could be en-
joined only if the government got wind of the transactions prior
to consummation, which was typically not the case.  Accordingly,
the only viable option for the government was to sue to “unbend
the pretzel” after the merger had been completed.  Unquestiona-
163 See supra  notes 25-29 and accompanying text.
164 15 U.S.C. § 18a (2000).
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bly, the HSR has markedly improved merger oversight both from
an enforcement and a business perspective.
b. The Merger Guidelines—Transparency
The 1982 Merger Guidelines provide a detailed roadmap speci-
fying how antitrust enforcement agencies will analyze mergers.165
This transparency of process minimizes uncertainty and enables
the parties better to gauge the legal risks of a merger transaction.
Transparency of process also promotes consistency of outcomes,
which also serves to minimize business risk.  Greater predictabil-
ity and reduction of risk serve to create a hospitable atmosphere
for commercial interactions.
c. The Merger Guidelines—Revival of Merger Activity
In the 1960s, a series of Supreme Court merger rulings culmi-
nating in the 1966 Von’s Grocery166 decision severely restricted
merger activity.  Indeed, in the aftermath of Von’s Grocery ,
where the Court struck down a merger market share that
amounted to less than eight percent of the relevant market,167
horizontal mergers came to be viewed as virtually per se unlaw-
ful.  The restrictive approach of Von’s Grocery  was codified in
the Antitrust Division’s 1968 Merger Guidelines,168 and merger
activity between rivals virtually disappeared.  Although the 1968
Guidelines soon withered on the vine, merger activity remained
in the doldrums throughout the 1970s.  It was not until the pro-
mulgation of the 1982 Merger Guidelines that merger transac-
tions were revived.  Departing from the earlier version of the
Guidelines and, more importantly, from existing case law prece-
dent, the 1982 Guidelines were rooted in the view that merger
activity was generally healthy and should be of concern only
where mergers would enhance market power and lead to higher
prices and lower output.169
This more hospitable regulatory approach to mergers, com-
bined with favorable economic conditions in the mid-1980s, led
to a surge in mergers that continued into the 1990s and peaked
with the high-tech boom in the latter half of that decade.  With
165 U.S. Dep’t of Justice Antitrust Div., supra  note 54.
166 United States v. Von’s Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966).
167 Id . at 277-78.
168 U.S. Dep’t of Justice Antitrust Div., Merger Guidelines—1968 , in  4 Trade Reg.
Rep. (CCH) ¶ 13,101, at 20,521 (Mar. 18, 1998).
169 See  U.S. Dep’t of Justice Antitrust Div., supra  note 54, ¶ 13,102, at 20,528-29.
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the HSR prenotification requirements in place, the Antitrust Di-
vision and the FTC were able to clear or restructure the over-
whelming majority of mergers.  Where the government
announced that it would contest transactions, some mergers sim-
ply folded;170 others were litigated.171  But for the HSR prenotifi-
cation requirements and the Merger Guidelines, it is unlikely
that the volume of merger activities in the past two decades could
have been sustained.
d. Administrative Resolution
Administrative resolution of antitrust issues in merger transac-
tions is a key element of modern merger enforcement policy.
Resolution of merger issues at the agency level, as opposed to in
the courts, has served to limit costs and reduce delays associated
with merger transactions.  Had the courts been the only arbiters
of mergers, the transactional volume over the last two decades
could not possibly have been sustained.
e. Reduction in Litigation
The administrative approach to merger enforcement has mini-
mized, but not eliminated, the need for litigation in merger en-
forcement.  Litigation remains a weapon of last resort.  Still, the
administrative model is not without its downside.  Given the rela-
tively few merger cases that have been litigated in the past
twenty years, merger law (as opposed to merger practice) has
stagnated.  The vast majority of judicial precedent in the merger
area, which developed in the 1950s and 1960s, is largely irrele-
vant to merger practice today, yet has never been overruled by
the courts.  The Supreme Court decided the last substantive
merger case under section 7 of the Clayton Act, in General Dy-
namics , which was over thirty years ago.172
Given the paucity of case law, courts facing merger issues to-
day have little useful case authority upon which to rely.  The ob-
vious downside of taking the bulk of the merger enforcement out
170 See  James Bernstein, Takeover Talk Good Medicine for Genovese’s Stock
Price , NEWSDAY, Sept. 7, 1996, at A21 (describing how Rite-Aide abandoned its
plans to buy Revco in 1996 after the FTC questioned the merger).
171 E.g.,  Fed. Trade Comm’n v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
(blocking merger between Heinz and Beech-Nut); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Staples,
Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066 (D.D.C. 1997) (enjoining merger between superstore giants
Staples and Office Depot).
172 United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974).
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of the courts has been to deny the federal judges who hear the
few merger cases that do make it to court the benefits of the
common law system: cases percolate through the system, consen-
sus is reached, precedents emerge, and the law is established.173
It would be both desirable and beneficial for the enforcement
agencies to litigate a greater number of merger cases in the
courts.174
On balance, however, the present system of merger enforce-
ment has worked well.
2. Equitable Remedies—Monopolization
In the wake of the Microsoft  decision, the issue of equitable
remedies in monopolization cases has become a hot topic of dis-
cussion, not only among antitrust lawyers, but also among the
public at large.  Unfortunately, the law with respect to equitable
remedies in monopolization is not well-developed; a review of
the antitrust case law and literature will bear this out.  This is
somewhat surprising, since it was the invocation of equitable
remedies—specifically, the breakup of Standard Oil175 and
American Tobacco176 during the heady trust-busting days of the
Roosevelt and Taft Administrations—that put antitrust on the
map nearly a century ago.  This is not to say that the issue of
equitable remedies has not arisen in monopolization cases since
Standard Oil .  On the contrary, issues of remedy loomed large in
the United Shoe Machinery  case,177 the AT&T  settlement that
broke up “the phone company,”178 and, of course, the recent
Microsoft  settlement.179  Still, the last court-ordered divestiture
in a monopolization case occurred in Grinnell  in 1966.180  Case
law on divestiture in monopolization cases since that time is vir-
tually nonexistent.  Accordingly, neither the courts nor the liti-
gants have had much judicial guidance concerning the
173 Stephen Calkins, In Praise of Antitrust Litigation , 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1, 1-8
(1998).
174 See id .
175 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
176 United States v. Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911).
177 United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 391 U.S. 244 (1968).
178 United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Corp., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), aff’d
sub nom.  Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
179 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 231 F. Supp. 2d 144 (D.D.C. 2002) (opinion
and order approving consent decree), aff’d sub nom.,  Massachusetts v. Microsoft
Corp., 373 F.3d 1199 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
180 United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
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appropriate legal standards governing the disposition in recent
monopolization cases, including Microsoft .
From the outset, the Microsoft  case proceeded under a cloud
of uncertainty with respect to the standards governing remedies
in monopolization cases.  That fact may explain why the Anti-
trust Division did not propose divestiture until near the very end
of trial.  The dearth of judicial guidance on monopolization rem-
edy may also explain why the reactions to Judge Jackson’s initial
divestiture order in Microsoft , its subsequent vacatur by the D.C.
Circuit, and the final settlement have been largely visceral rather
than the products of thoughtful legal and economic analysis.
The remainder of Part II will examine and compare equitable
remedies in monopolization cases.  As a threshold matter, Sec-
tion II.C.2 will (a) discuss the continuing relevance of antitrust
principles to high-tech markets and (b) review the costs and ben-
efits of various forms of equitable relief.  The discussion will then
explore how equitable remedies have been applied in the past,
including the Microsoft  case, in Section II.D; propose some
guidelines for determining the appropriate equitable remedy in
Section II.E; and review the interrelationship between equitable
relief and other antitrust remedies, including deregulation, in
Section II.F.
a. Antitrust and High-Tech Markets
Throughout the pendency of the Microsoft  case, many ques-
tioned whether the century-old Sherman Act, signed into law in
an era when heavy industry and capital investment were the driv-
ing forces in the economy, is still relevant in the new millen-
nium—in a mature economy, based on human capital and
information technology, and driven largely by high-tech compa-
nies.181  Those who contend that antitrust is outmoded would ar-
gue that technology is eradicating imperfections in market
economies.182  The new economy has smoothed out business cy-
181 See  Appellate Brief for Microsoft Corp. at 16-19, 88-92, 133, United States v.
Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Christian Ahlborn et al., Competition
Policy in the New Economy:  Is European Competition Law Up to the Challenge ,
2001 EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 22(5), at 156-67 (2001); DAVID S. EVANS & RICH-
ARD SCHMALENSEE, SOME ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF ANTITRUST ANALYSIS IN DY-
NAMICALLY COMPETITIVE INDUSTRIES (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No.  8268) (2001). But see  Jonathan M. Jacobson, Do We Need A “New Econ-
omy” Exception For Antitrust? , 16 ANTITRUST A.B.A. 89 (Fall 2001) (arguing
against any “new economy” exception in monopolization cases).
182 Lester C. Thurow, Let’s Abolish the Antitrust Laws , N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 1980,
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cles and made it more difficult for sellers to raise prices and
lower output.  The accelerating pace of technological change cre-
ates continuous opportunities to challenge established leaders in
various industries.  No market leader is safe from competitive ini-
tiatives and entrenchment is virtually impossible.  Microsoft and
other industry leaders must innovate, for unless they offer new
and better products, rivals will leave them in the dust.  Antitrust
is therefore redundant in self-correcting high-tech markets, and
its use would serve only to chill innovation and slow economic
development.
There is certainly a grain of truth in this argument.  No one
would seriously argue with the proposition that high-tech mar-
kets are  different from smokestack industries in significant ways.
Rapid innovation has created shorter product cycles.  Word Star
and MTST machines, once hot products, have come and gone in
a flash.  Today’s ever-changing marketplace makes it harder for a
firm to obtain dominance in a product.  Still, achieving domi-
nance is not impossible, as the Windows experience amply dem-
onstrates.  In fact, the changes wrought by the high-tech
economy cut both ways on the question of antitrust.  While it is
true that the rapid-innovation characteristic of the high-tech
economy is a major hurdle to creating and sustaining monopoly
power, it is also true that the high-tech marketplace may in some
ways be more susceptible to antitrust problems than old-fash-
ioned manufacturing markets.  Specifically, high-tech markets
may experience antitrust problems because of the phenomenon
of network externalities.183  Network externalities lead to en-
trenchment, even in the face of innovation.184
Indeed, network externalities may entrench the Microsofts of
the world even deeper as newer and cheaper technologies enter
the market.  First, the new networks face significant hurdles in
attracting a critical mass of buyers and suppliers.  Buyers and
suppliers are more inclined to stick with the incumbent network
§ 3, at 2; see also LESTER C. THUROW, THE ZERO-SUM SOCIETY:  DISTRIBUTION
AND THE POSSIBILITIES FOR ECONOMIC CHANGE 145 (1980) (noting modern tech-
nologies’ role in economic change). See generally  Spencer Weber Waller, The Mod-
ern Antitrust Relevance of Oliver Wendell Holmes , 59 BROOK. L. REV. 1443, 1464-68
(1994) (explaining the importance of modern technologies in antitrust).
183 See  R. Craig Romaine & Steven C. Salop, Slap Their Wrists?  Tie Their
Hands?  Slice Them Into Pieces?  Alternative Remedies For Monopolization in the
Microsoft Case , 13 ANTITRUST A.B.A. 15, 17-18 (Summer 1999).
184 See id . at 17-18, 23.
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and face significant economic disincentives to join a new net-
work.  In the face of high switching costs, they may be locked
into the old network.  Second, the incumbent network may com-
pete aggressively to retain its installed base through price compe-
tition, promotions, or product variation.  Unless the incumbent
network is developing better or less expensive products, the
short-run benefits of network externalities may result in a long-
run detriment to consumers by depriving them of newer and bet-
ter technologies.
The argument that 115 years of antitrust jurisprudence should
be so jettisoned in cases involving high-tech markets because
those markets change fast and the antitrust enforcement appara-
tus is just too slow brings with it a heavy burden of persuasion.
Antitrust critics have simply not made the case for the proposi-
tion that antitrust is irrelevant to the high-tech marketplace of
the twenty-first century.  The argument that high-tech markets
are self-correcting is to a great extent just old wine in new bot-
tles.  Throughout its history, antitrust has been a whipping boy.
Professor McGee, in an effort to rewrite history, has urged that
Standard Oil be remembered for its benevolence rather than its
predatory behavior.185  As discussed more fully below,186 anti-
trust enforcers were derided for pressing monopolization claims
against IBM in the 1960s and AT&T in 1970s.  In the 1970s and
1980s, when some observers saw the United States as a distinct
second to Japan in technological development, antitrust was
again the culprit.  Legislation was enacted to limit the reach of
the antitrust laws in cases involving foreign commerce.187  The
late Malcolm Baldridge, Secretary of Commerce under President
Reagan, went so far as to advocate the repeal of Section 7 of the
Clayton Act after certain mergers in the oil industry came under
regulatory scrutiny.188
Far from being outdated, antitrust continues to be relevant as a
tool for assuring free markets and access to free markets, which,
in turn, fosters innovation and provides consumers with the high-
est quality goods and services at the lowest prices.  Perhaps, anti-
trust has never been more relevant.  An enduring quality of
185 John S. McGee, Predatory Price Cutting:  The Standard Oil (N.J.) Case , 1 J.L.
& ECON. 137, 137-38 (1958).
186 See infra  note 249 and accompanying text.
187 Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6a (2000).
188 See Baldridge Proposes Repeal of Antitrust Language, Olmer Japan Trip is
Cancelled , in  2 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA), at 284 (Feb. 27, 1985).
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antitrust law has been its adaptability to changing economic scen-
ery.  Technology may impact the way that we view antitrust is-
sues, but it does not eliminate the need for antitrust law.
Moreover, even if one were to accept the view that antitrust
should play a reduced role, or no role, in the new economy, that
concession would still be unavailing to high-tech firms.
Microsoft  was not about the new economy but rather about old-
fashioned monopolistic exclusion in the high-tech context.  Mo-
nopolistic exclusion has always been unlawful under the antitrust
laws, and a monopolist cannot receive a free pass simply because
it deals in high-tech products.
b. Equitable Remedies: Conduct and Structural Relief
Compared
Post-judgment remedies fall into two broad categories: conduct
remedies and structural remedies.  Economist F.M. Scherer once
likened conduct remedies to drug therapy and structural reme-
dies to surgery.189  That analogy is apt.  Conduct remedies are
less invasive and may take some time to work.  Structural reme-
dies are radical but may cure the problem right away.  Keep in
mind, however, that the filing of a lawsuit itself may have an im-
pact on a defendant’s conduct.  A lawsuit alone may chill the
vigor with which a defendant pursues various buying and selling
strategies challenged by the government, or deter similar conduct
in the future.  There is some evidence that Microsoft may have
backed down on compliance with certain contractual demands
during the pendency of the government action.190
(i) Conduct Remedies
Conduct remedies are the most frequently invoked by the
courts in monopolization cases.  As a former head of the Anti-
trust Division has stated: “An antitrust remedy for a Section 2
violation must stop the offending conduct, prevent its recurrence,
and restore competition.”191  Accordingly, conduct remedies may
affect an entire range of a firm’s business activities.  Thus, a con-
189 Romaine & Salop, supra  note 183, at 17.
190 See  Joseph Nocera, Google This: Is Microsoft Still a Bully? , N.Y. TIMES, May
21, 2005, at C-1, C-4 (arguing that Microsoft’s failure to aggressively attack Google
is strong evidence that Microsoft’s business behavior has been tempered by the anti-
trust trial).
191 Charles A. James, The Real Microsoft Case and Settlement , 16 ANTITRUST
A.B.A. 58, 60 (Fall 2001).
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duct order may direct the defendant to terminate any exclusive
dealing arrangements or to stop bundling goods.  Conduct orders
may go further and impose affirmative duties on the defendant,
including: (1) an obligation to sell to all customers on a non-dis-
criminatory basis; (2) compulsory licensing of intellectual prop-
erty; (3) separate sale of products now bundled as one product;
and (4) creation of products that comply with industry standards
as opposed to a company’s proprietary standards.  A conduct or-
der will generally include affirmative duties because real-world
markets operate in real time, and a court cannot simply enjoin
conduct and then wait for markets to correct themselves.  The
defendant, as a successful monopolist, may have driven all rivals
and potential rivals from the field.  Without some form of
mandatory licensing, there may be no entity to join the competi-
tive fray, and no way to restore competitive equilibrium in the
marketplace.
Nevertheless, commentators are divided as to whether the net
effect of compulsory licensing is to promote competition.  In the
mid-1970s, the FTC settled its monopolization suit against Xerox
with a consent decree requiring Xerox to license royalty free any
three of its dry paper copier patents and to cease pursuit of cer-
tain infringement claims.192  Some economists found that the de-
cree promoted entry;193 others found it inefficient.194
Conduct remedies, however, are not always sufficient to pro-
tect the public interest.  First, conduct remedies concern only fu-
ture behavior and do not address a company’s accumulated
market power.  Thus, even with an injunction in place, a com-
pany may be able to inflict ongoing damage to the economy be-
cause of its residual market power.  Accordingly, a conduct
decree by itself may not be adequate to restore competitive bal-
ance in the marketplace.
Second, like the Versailles Treaty, the conduct decree may
serve only to provide the battlefield for the next war.  The decree
may become an ongoing source of friction between the defendant
and government regulators.  For example, in the United Shoe
Machinery  case, Judge Wyzanski imposed conduct remedies on
192 In re  Xerox Corp., 186 F.T.C. 364, 373-83 (1975).
193 F.M. Scherer, Antitrust, Efficiency, and Progress , 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 998, 1016-
17 (1987); Timothy F. Bresnahan, Post-Entry Competition in the Plain Paper Copier
Market , 75 AM. ECON. REV. 15, 15 (May 1985).
194 See, e.g. , DOUGLAS H. GINSBURG, ANTITRUST, UNCERTAINTY, AND TECHNO-
LOGICAL INNOVATION 30-33 (1980).
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the defendant, a shoe-making equipment manufacturer, and re-
jected the government’s calls for divestiture.195  Ten years later,
the government was back in court, arguing that conduct remedies
had failed to bring about competitive conditions in the shoe-
making equipment marketplace.196  Judge Wyzanski again
balked; but, ultimately, the Supreme Court prodded him to re-
consider, and, in the face of certain dissolution, United Shoe Ma-
chinery agreed to divest sufficient assets to bring its market share
below thirty-three percent.197
The third shortcoming of conduct decrees follows from the sec-
ond: conduct orders require ongoing judicial supervision and
may consume an inordinate amount of the supervising judge’s
time.  Invariably, the court becomes enmeshed in petty squabbles
among the parties.  The ASCAP consent decree is perhaps the
best current example of the burdens that conduct decrees impose
on the courts.  Under that decree, the supervising judge must sit
as a rate court when the parties are unable to agree on license
fees.198  A review of the case law reported since the promulga-
tion of the ASCAP decree readily reveals that the courts have
had more than their fair share of involvement in the licensing of
creative works.
(ii) Structural Remedies
Structural relief is invoked by the courts with far less fre-
quency than conduct relief.  Structural remedies are more radical
than conduct remedies and are appropriate when the court deter-
mines that conduct sanctions are not sufficient to get the market
back on the competitive track.  The Supreme Court has held that
it is not enough for a court to merely prohibit specific miscon-
duct; it should also “pry open to competition a market that has
been closed by defendants’ illegal restraints.”199  Structural relief
may include dividing a monopolist into two or more separate
companies, perhaps along functional lines.  That, of course, is
195 United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953),
aff’d per curiam , 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
196 United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 266 F. Supp. 328 (D. Mass. 1967).
197 United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 391 U.S. 244 (1968).
198 See, e.g. , ASCAP v. Showtime/The Movie Channel, Inc., 912 F.2d 563 (2d Cir.
1990).
199 Int’l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 401 (1947) (quoted in Ford Motor
Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562, 577-78 (1972)).
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precisely what the trial court ordered in Microsoft .200  A varia-
tion on the foregoing would be to divide a monopolist into two or
more competing integrated companies.  A third alternative might
require some combination of structural and conduct relief.  For
example, as in Microsoft  below, a court might order the creation
of one or more new rivals and require the monopolist to license
intellectual property to those newly created entities.201
Structural relief has several advantages over conduct mea-
sures.  First, structural relief can eliminate market power in one
fell swoop.202  It is a way of jump-starting competition in a vic-
timized marketplace.  Structural relief is much more likely than
conduct relief to pay long-term procompetitive dividends.203
Second, structural relief is generally more efficient to administer
because, unlike the case of conduct relief, it does not require
continuing close scrutiny.204  Courts do not have to worry about
whether a specific practice by a defendant violated a provision of
the conduct decree.  Courts are therefore less likely to become
enmeshed in the minutiae of the decree on an ongoing basis.
Nor do courts have to worry about rivals thwarting the procom-
petitive goals of the conduct decree by engaging in strategic
behavior.
Critics of structural relief argue that it is too radical and liken
divestiture to curing the disease by killing the patient.  They
point out that divestiture may lead to market fragmentation and
loss of scale economies, which, in turn, may lead to loss of effi-
ciencies.205  In addition, use of structural remedies may create
overdeterrence of wrongful conduct.206  Faced with the potential
of a draconian divestiture, a company may choose to forgo con-
duct that is, in fact, procompetitive and beneficial to
consumers.207
Furthermore, critics assert that perceived administrative effi-
ciencies from structural relief are largely illusory.208  In their
view, it is naive to believe that a court can sign a divestiture de-
200 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 59 (D.D.C. 2000).
201 Id .
202 Romaine & Salop, supra  note 183, at 17-18.
203 Id . at 18.
204 Id . at 18-19.
205 Id . at 19-20.
206 Id .
207 Id .
208 Richard B. Schmitt, A Breakup Primer for Microsoft , WALL ST. J., June 6,
2000, at B1.
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cree and then wash its hands of the matter.209  They point to
Judge Greene’s frequent involvement in post-divestiture issues
and disputes following the AT&T breakup, particularly those in-
volving line-of-business restrictions.210  Some critics believe that
the line-of-business restrictions themselves are anticompeti-
tive.211  Finally, critics express concern about the adverse impact
of divestiture on employees and shareholders in the form of lost
jobs and loss in value of shares.212  In their view, divestiture is too
extreme because it extracts a double penalty.  It punishes the
company by breaking it up which, in turn, punishes employees
and shareholders.
D. Equitable Remedies in the Courts
In deciding the appropriate antitrust remedy, courts normally
look to past decisions.  Unfortunately, as noted, the case law on
structural remedies is sparse and outdated.213  Set forth below is
a discussion of leading antitrust cases involving equitable reme-
dies. This discussion sheds some light on how courts might re-
solve questions about equitable relief.
1. Microsoft
Much has been written about the Microsoft  case.  Media cov-
erage of the trial was unprecedented in scope, and as the
Microsoft  story migrated from the business pages to the front
pages of daily newspapers and to lead story on the evening news,
even antitrust junkies began to feel like overdose victims.  Pri-
vate actions against Microsoft are ongoing,214 but the govern-
ment action has faded from the spotlight.  Still, many astute
observers of the antitrust scene find an unsettling disconnect be-
tween the findings during the liability phase of the case and the
ultimate remedy agreed to by the Justice Department to settle
the matter.215
209 Id .
210 Id .
211 Id .
212 William E. Kovacic, Desizing Antitrust Remedies for Dominant Firm Miscon-
duct , 31 CONN. L. REV. 1285, 1303 (1999) (noting criticism of the AT&T divestiture
decree); John E. Lopatka and William H. Page, Devising A Microsoft Remedy That
Serves Consumers , 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 691, 712 (2001) (noting potential adverse
effects of a Microsoft dissolution on both shareholders and employees).
213 See supra  notes 175-80 and accompanying text.
214 See, e.g. , In re  Microsoft Corp. Antitrust Litig., 218 F.R.D. 449 (D. Md. 2003).
215 Timothy F. Bresnahan, A Remedy that Falls Short of Restoring Competition , 16
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Following a seventy-six-day bench trial on liability issues,
Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson in a detailed opinion found that
Microsoft had unlawfully: (1) maintained a monopoly in Intel-
compatible PC operating systems; (2) attempted to monopolize
the market for Internet browsers; and (3) tied the sale of its Win-
dows operating system to its Internet Explorer.216  The court
found that Microsoft had engaged in a variety of exclusionary
acts in order to maintain its monopoly, including: (1) the way in
which Microsoft integrated Internet Explorer into Windows; (2)
its various dealings with equipment manufacturers and software
vendors; (3) its attempts to subvert Java technologies; and (4) its
overall course of conduct.217  After the liability phase of the case
had been completed, the court requested that the plaintiffs sub-
mit a proposed remedy.218  The plaintiffs requested specific con-
duct remedies plus a structural remedy that would split Microsoft
into an applications company and an operating systems com-
pany.219  Subsequently, without holding a formal evidentiary
hearing on remedies, the court granted the relief sought by the
plaintiffs without substantive change.220
On appeal, the D.C. Circuit vacated the remedies decree and
modified the liability determinations.221  In a scathing opinion,
the appellate court rebuked Judge Jackson for: (1) failing to hold
a formal evidentiary hearing on remedies; (2) failing to provide
adequate reasons to justify the decreed remedies; and (3) violat-
ing the Code of Conduct for United States Judges by talking
about the case with reporters.222  The court of appeals reversed
the trial court’s determination that Microsoft was liable for at-
ANTITRUST A.B.A. 67, 67 (Fall 2001).  More recently, a reporter who had covered
the Microsoft trial questioned whether the outcome in that case had made any dif-
ference.  Nocera, supra  note 190.  On the one hand, the reporter noted that on the
surface things are still pretty much the same as they were prior to trial in that
Microsoft still retains monopolies in the Windows operating system and the Office
suite of applications. Id.  at C1.  On the other hand, the reporter observed that
Microsoft’s failure to respond aggressively to the competitive inroads made by
Google in web-based applications is strong evidence that its competitive strategy has
been tempered by the government’s antitrust action. Id . at C4.
216 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 45 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied , 534
U.S. 952 (2001).
217 Id . at 58.
218 Id . at 48.
219 Id .
220 Id .
221 See id . at 98-105.
222 Id . at 107-16.
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tempted monopolization and unlawful tying.223  The court of ap-
peals also reversed eight findings that the trial court had
concluded were violations of the antitrust laws.224  At the same
time, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s core findings
that Microsoft had been a monopolist and had committed twelve
specific acts of monopolization,225 a fact that is lost on some revi-
sionist writers.  The matter was remanded for a new determina-
tion on the remedies issue, and Judge Jackson was disqualified
from further participation in the case.226
On remand, Microsoft faced not only a new judge but also a
revamped government team headed by Charles James, newly ap-
pointed by President Bush to lead the Antitrust Division.  James
made three critical decisions designed to conclude the Microsoft
case: (1) the demand for structural relief was dropped; (2) the
tying claim was abandoned; and (3) the government aggressively
pursued settlement negotiations.227  The matter was thereafter
settled, with Microsoft entering into a consent decree in which it
accepted certain restrictions on its conduct of business.228  Critics
of the settlement argued that the relief obtained was limited to
the unlawful conduct and did not address structural issues, such
as barriers to entry, which permitted the Microsoft monopoly to
become entrenched.229  Mr. James had expressed the view that
“[r]estoration requires prospective relief to create lost competi-
tion and may involve actions to disadvantage the antitrust of-
fender and/or favor its rivals.”230
The Antitrust Division, on the other hand, was of the view that
its hands were tied by what it regarded as the court of appeals’
skepticism about the appropriateness of structural relief as well
as the appellate court’s reversal of the attempted monopolization
and tying claims.231  In its view, relief had to address proven vio-
lations, and since the monopoly maintenance claim was the only
claim to survive appellate scrutiny, the remedy had to focus on
“middleware or middleware-type threats to the operating sys-
223 Id . at 83-84, 95.
224 Id . at 98-105.
225 Id . at 118-19.
226 Id . at 117-19.
227 See  James, supra  note 191, at 60-62.
228 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 231 F. Supp. 2d 144 (D.D.C. 2002).
229 Bresnahan, supra  note 215, at 67.
230 James, supra  note 191, at 61.
231 Id . at 60.
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tem.”232  Relief could not be comprised of “a laundry list of unre-
lated requirements competitors might find useful.”233  While the
government has acknowledged that there is unhappiness with the
final decree, it has dismissed much of the criticism as sour grapes
from competitors pursuing their own self-interests and not neces-
sarily the welfare of consumers.234
Still, not everyone accepts the government’s defense of the fi-
nal decree in Microsoft , and critics still question whether that de-
cree and the narrow relief embodied therein will encourage
competition and innovation.235  Indeed, European regulators ap-
pear to share the view of critics of the Microsoft  decree.  In its
parallel action against Microsoft, the EU, which has broad pow-
ers to impose remedies that correct market failure, does not view
itself as limited to addressing proven wrongs and has taken a
broader view of the remedy needed to cure Microsoft’s abuse of
dominant position.236  Specifically, it has announced that
Microsoft, in addition to paying a $613 million fine, must make
versions of Windows available without Windows Media Player.237
It is precisely this “a la carte” approach that the Antitrust Divi-
sion rejected out of hand.238  Time will tell whether the EU’s reg-
ulatory approach will be more effective in fostering a competitive
environment than the more limited, market-based approach
adopted by the Antitrust Division.
2. AT&T
Structural relief, particularly divestiture, is indeed strong
medicine.  Nevertheless, when properly prescribed, it can jump-
start competition and restore the marketplace to robust health.
The AT&T experience bears this out.  Recall the state of tele-
communications in the United States in 1974 when the Antitrust
Division under Thomas Kauper brought its monopolization case
against AT&T, alleging that AT&T used its dominance in local
phone service to exclude rivals in long distance service and to
exclude rivals in telephone equipment.  AT&T dominated local
phone service and, through its control of local interchanges, had
232 Id . at 65.
233 Id . at 64.
234 See id . at 63-64.
235 See  Bresnahan, supra  note 215, at 68.
236 See  Commission Decision of 24.03.2004, supra  note 93.
237 Id .
238 James, supra  note 191, at 64.
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a lock on long distance phone service.  AT&T controlled the
manufacture and sale of phone equipment through its subsidiary
Western Electric.  It also controlled research and development
through Bell Labs.
Wireless communication was virtually unheard of.  Fax ma-
chines and answering machines were in their infancy.  The In-
ternet was unknown.  The term “modem” was not yet part of
our vocabulary.  Bell-manufactured rotary phones were state
of the art.  Long distance calls were expensive.  AT&T had
nine calling-rate zones in the United States, and a coast-to-
coast call was 74 cents per minute for the first minute and 49
cents per additional minute.239
After nearly eight years of litigation, and several failed settle-
ment attempts, AT&T agreed to settle the suit with the govern-
ment.240  The vehicle for the settlement was the modification of a
1956 consent decree to which AT&T was a party.241  As a part of
the settlement, AT&T agreed to break itself up by divesting its
ownership of local phone services.242  Local phone services
would, under the modified consent decree, be owned and oper-
ated by seven regional companies, known as Bell Operating
Companies (“BOCs”) or Baby Bells.243  AT&T retained owner-
ship of its long-distance business, equipment manufacturing, and
research and development.244  As part of the modified consent
decree, certain line-of-business restrictions imposed on AT&T
under the 1956 consent decree were lifted.245  In 1996, however,
AT&T spun off its equipment manufacturing business into Lu-
cent Technologies, Inc.246  The AT&T divestiture was unprece-
dented in size and scope.247  AT&T was a $150-billion
corporation—the largest in the world at the time of the
239 Rebecca Blumenstein, How the Split-Up Touched Everyone , WALL ST. J., June
6, 2000, at B1.
240 United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), aff’d sub
nom.,  United States v. Maryland, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
241 Id . at 141.
242 Id .
243 Id . at 141-43.
244 Id . at 226-34; see  Floyd Norris, From a Blue Chip to a Cut Below the Blue-Plate
Special , N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2004, at C2.
245 AT&T , 552 F. Supp. at 226-34.
246 Seth Schiesel, Lucent Announces a Spartan Strategy To Put Itself Right , N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 25, 2001, at C1.
247 John Riley, Legal Upheaval at AT&T; Ma Bell’s Lawyers Gear Up For Divesti-
ture , NAT’L L.J., Oct. 24, 1983, 1, 1.
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breakup—with one million employees nationwide.248
The parallels between the AT&T  and Microsoft  cases are
striking.  In both cases, the Antitrust Division challenged illegal
practices designed to extend and maintain the monopolies of
firms with monopoly power in critical markets.  In both cases, the
Antitrust Division sought structural relief to preserve and protect
competition.  In both cases, the Antitrust Division was criticized
for challenging a technology leader operating in a critical part of
the U.S. infrastructure.  In 1974, the Wall Street Journal  pub-
lished an especially vituperative editorial attacking the Antitrust
Division’s investigation of AT&T:249
While the Justice Department can’t promise any consumer
benefits that might result from its suit to break up [the com-
pany], it is sure of one thing: This is the largest antitrust action
ever filed.  So much for the mentality of modern-day trustbust-
ers.  As long as they can tackle the biggest of all “big busi-
nesses,” what is the difference whether the massive
expenditure of federal money and effort is likely to cut any-
one’s . . . bills?  Where is the problem that justifies risking pos-
sible damage to the efficiency of a vital part of the U.S.
infrastructure? Damage to the investments of innumerable
small investors and pension fund beneficiaries; possible dam-
age to an important research and development enterprise?  If
there is a problem that justifies all this we can’t find it.  Maybe
it is because we prefer to deal in economics, rather than polit-
ics in such matters.
The similarities between the criticism leveled at AT&T  in the
Wall Street Journal  over thirty years ago and the criticism of the
Microsoft  enforcement action today are equally striking.  Not
surprisingly, as Professor Kovacic points out in an excellent law
review article, Standard Oil made similar warnings of impending
industrial apocalypse in opposing its 1911 divestiture.250
Despite those criticisms, the AT&T divestiture has been a re-
sounding success.  The breakup unleashed innovation, enhanced
services and price competition on an unprecedented scale, all of
which inured to the benefit of the consumer.
248 Jeremy Main, Waking Up at AT&T: There’s Life After Culture Shock , FOR-
TUNE, Dec. 24, 1984, at 66.
249 Untitled editorial, WALL ST. J., November 22, 1974, at 18.
250 William E. Kovacic, Designing Antitrust Remedies for Dominant Firm Miscon-
duct , 31 CONN. L. REV. 1285, 1298 (1999).
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a. Price Competition
Competition in long-distance phone service is robust.  Over
100 carriers now offer long-distance service.251  Long-distance
rates have dropped by at least fifty percent.252  Due to aggressive
price competition among AT&T, Sprint, and MCI, the cost of a
coast-to-coast call is no more than 29 cents per minute, down
from the rate of 74 cents for the first minute and 49 cents per
minute thereafter, as noted above.253
In addition, many consumers pay as low as 5 cents per minute
under discount plans with a monthly fee.254  Some plans handle
local, regional, and long-distance calling so that there is no sepa-
rate charge for long-distance calls.  Moreover, customers may
also receive discounts in the form of rebates or membership re-
wards.  Some phone companies offer airline miles.  Competition
in local phone service is beginning to take shape and also
promises savings for the consumer.
b. Innovation
The breakup also spawned significant technical advances in
telecommunications.  Companies replaced aging copper wire
lines with fiber-optic cables that provide for clearer and faster
transmissions and carry larger volumes of voice and data.255
Phone lines now provide high-speed access to the Internet.  This
enhanced capacity has fostered the explosive growth of Internet
traffic.256  Data and voice are now carried in digital rather than
analog form.  In addition, wireless phones are ubiquitous.  Voice
activated phones are around the corner, and dial phones are a
thing of the past.
c. New Services
The breakup also produced a market basket of new services,
including three-way calling, call waiting, call forwarding, caller
identification, text messaging, and call back.257  Never before has
the consumer faced so much choice.
251 Blumenstein, supra  note 239.
252 Id .
253 Id .
254 Id .
255 Id .
256 Id .
257 Id .
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On the other hand, the breakup has produced some unpleasant
bumps for consumers.  First, since the divestiture, local rates for
telephones have risen in most areas.258  In part, this may be due
to the fact that local companies have been able to sell additional
services to consumers, such as caller identification.259  No doubt,
strategic behavior by the BOCs is also at least partly responsible
for the increases.  The good news is that burgeoning competition
for local phone service has begun to put downward pressure on
local rates.  Telephone service providers now offer local, re-
gional, and long-distance services in a bundle, permitting con-
sumers to obtain significant savings in overall expenditures for
phone services.
Second, many consumers have complained about a decline in
service.260  In the pre-breakup days, one company was responsi-
ble for equipment and repair.  Service was prompt and included
in the monthly bill.  Today, it is not always clear whether the
equipment provider, the line maintenance provider, or the local
phone company is responsible for a problem; finger-pointing is
not unusual.261  Moreover, consumers may have to wait days for
repair.
Third, telecommunications companies have been somewhat
slow to expand into new areas.  It had been hoped under the
1996 Telecommunications Act that phone companies would offer
cable television access and thus challenge the local monopolies
held by cable companies.  Instead, the phone companies seem
content to simply acquire cable companies; witness AT&T’s ac-
quisition of Media One and its subsequent sale to cable giant
Comcast.  Some BOCs established by the breakup have chosen
to recombine rather than to compete, as was the case with
NYNEX and Bell Atlantic merging to form Verizon.262
On balance, however, the benefits of the AT&T divestiture far
outweigh any problems that have resulted.  The AT&T experi-
ence offers several important lessons.
1. Structural relief is the most efficient mechanism to rid the
258 Id .
259 Id .
260 Id .
261 Id .
262 For a report that details the shortcomings of the AT&T settlement, see PETER
W. HUBER, THE GEODESIC NETWORK: 1987 REPORT ON COMPETITION IN THE TELE-
PHONE INDUSTRY (1987).
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field of anticompetitive conduct and its effects and to jump-
start the restoration of competition in the marketplace.
2. Breaking up a monopolist has the potential of unleashing
innovation and competition on a magnitude of that produced
by the AT&T divestiture.  We are not sure what the nature of
that innovation will be.  However, keep in mind that in 1974
no one was talking about the Internet.
3. The AT&T divestiture proves that a breakup does not nec-
essarily mean a loss of efficiency.  Indeed, the decree permits
the new entities to share technical data to prevent the loss of
efficiencies.263
4. There are likely to be some bumps in the road, as well as
some unforeseen problems that will arise as any divestiture
unfolds.  The judge must be prepared to act swiftly and deci-
sively to address those problems.
3. United Shoe Machinery
United Shoe Machinery  also has lessons on remedies, but those
lessons go largely to procedure rather than to substance.  The
first lesson is that a judge must be cautious when fashioning anti-
trust remedies:264
Judges in prescribing remedies have known their own limita-
tions.  They do not ex officio have economic or political train-
ing.  Their prophecies as to economic future are not guided by
unusually subtle judgment . . . .  Judicial decrees must be fitted
into the framework of what a busy, and none too expert, court
can supervise . . . .  [A] trial judge is only one man, and should
move with caution and humility.
Second, in imposing a remedy, it is the “duty of the Court to
prescribe relief that will terminate the illegal monopoly, deny to
the defendant the fruits of its statutory violation, and ensure that
there remain no practices likely to result in monopolization in
the future.”265
Third, if it turns out that the initial relief granted by the court
did not accomplish these goals, it is “the duty of the court to
modify the decree so as to assure the complete extirpation of the
illegal monopoly.”266
Unfortunately, the experience under the United Shoe Machin-
ery  decree is not particularly illuminating.  We do know that the
263 See  United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 226-34 (D.D.C.
1982).
264 United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 347 (D. Mass.
1953).
265 United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 391 U.S. 244, 250 (1968).
266 Id . at 251.
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conduct strictures were inadequate.  However, we cannot defi-
nitely decide whether divestiture would have promoted competi-
tion because of changing economic conditions in shoes.  A
decade after reducing its market share to thirty-three percent of
the shoe machinery market, United Shoe Machinery was out of
business, a victim of the migration of the shoe industry to outside
U.S. borders.  Ironically, the complex that once housed United
Shoe Machinery in Beverly, Massachusetts, is now occupied by
high-tech companies.267
E. Fashioning Equitable Remedies: Some Guidelines
Unquestionably, Microsoft  has alerted the bench and the anti-
trust bar of the need to rethink equitable remedies in monopoli-
zation cases, both substantively and procedurally.  Remedies
should be at the top of the agenda from the outset of litigation.
Enforcers should be considering remedies from the moment an
investigation is commenced.  Discussion of remedies among the
parties should continue throughout the pretrial phase of the case,
together with liability issues, but perhaps on a separate track.
Once the cards are on the table with respect to remedies, mean-
ingful settlement discussions can proceed.  Equally important, if
a settlement is not reached, the court must provide a hearing at
which the parties can air their views on remedies.  Set forth be-
low are some guidelines to help courts fashion appropriate equi-
table remedies in monopolization cases.
1. Proportionality
The overarching principle of equitable remedies in monopoli-
zation cases is that the remedy must be proportional to the
wrongdoing.268  The more serious the wrongdoing, the harsher
the remedy.  The seriousness of the conduct is relevant to the
remedy because the more serious the conduct, the greater the
likelihood that it adversely impacted competition.  And, the
greater the harm to competition, the more radical the surgery
needed to restore competition, and the greater the need to reed-
ucate the marketplace.  The goal here is not to punish the wrong-
267 David A. Balto, United Shoe: A Reminder About Relief in Monopolization
Cases , FTC: WATCH, No. 517 (Mar. 1, 1999).
268 See generally  E. Thomas Sullivan, Comparing Antitrust Remedies in the U.S.
and E.U.: Advancing a Standard of Proportionality , 48 ANTITRUST BULL. 377 (2003)
(symposium issue).
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doer.  Punishment is an appropriate goal in a criminal proceeding
and, to a lesser extent, in a private treble damages action.  In-
stead, the proper aim of the injunctive remedy is to restore com-
petition to the marketplace.
By gearing the remedy to specific anticompetitive effects in the
marketplace, the doctrine of proportionality minimizes the likeli-
hood of creation of perverse incentives that would either un-
derdeter or overdeter market behavior.  The doctrine of
proportionality has a long history in European law, and, indeed is
a specific criterion for fashioning equitable relief in abuse of
dominance cases.269  The concept of proportionality is not un-
known in U.S. law, but it has never been viewed as a specific
factor to be taken into account in deciding the nature of equita-
ble relief in monopolization cases.270  Nevertheless, the propor-
tionality concept is present in what enforcement officials have
identified as the necessary requirements of an effective antitrust
remedy: (1) stopping the unlawful conduct; (2) preventing its re-
currence; and (3) restoring competition to the marketplace.271
Unfortunately, U.S. enforcement agencies have not consist-
ently applied these three principles when fashioning equitable
remedies.272  Decrees often focus on the first two elements and
do not address restoration of competition in the marketplace.273
Ignoring the third element creates a serious risk that the ultimate
decree will be toothless, as some have argued with respect to the
decree in Microsoft .274  On the other hand, taking into account
restoration of competition in the marketplace as a goal of anti-
trust remedy would require the courts and the agencies to ex-
amine structural conditions in the marketplace; most
importantly, courts and agencies would focus on barriers to en-
try.275  Analysis of entry conditions is crucial in creating and eval-
uating a remedy.276  If the monopolist’s dominant position is
insulated by high entry barriers, any decree that does not attempt
269 Id . at 416-19.
270 Id . at 419-20.  Professor Sullivan points out that proportionality principles
have played a significant role in the development of constitutional law
jurisprudence.
271 See  James, supra  note 191, at 60-61.
272 Sullivan, supra  note 268, at 420.
273 Id .
274 See  Bresnahan, supra  note 215.
275 Sullivan, supra  note 268, at 421.
276 Id .
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to lower those barriers would not effectively restore competition
and hence is doomed to failure.
2. Minimize Harm
The remedy should be one that minimizes harm to the econ-
omy.  The Hippocratic Oath277 enjoins physicians as healers first
to do no harm.  Courts should follow this principle.  The courts
must consider both the risk of doing too little, and the losses as-
sociated with that approach, as well as the risk of doing too
much, and the losses associated with that course of conduct.  For
example, if the court decrees a conduct remedy, it must measure
the risk that the competitive landscape will not change materially
over time and the dominant firm will become even more en-
trenched or that competitors will grow discouraged and walk
away.  Similarly, if the remedy is too strong, the court must deter-
mine the risks that the conduct decree will lead to loss of efficien-
cies and a chilling of incentive to innovate.  Calibrating the risk
of harm, however, is no easy task.  No one can ever guarantee ex
ante that a remedy designed to restore a healthy marketplace will
not have undesirable spillover effects.
3. Procompetitive Benefits of Challenged Conduct
The remedy should also take into account the procompetitive
benefits of the conduct.  Acts that are unambiguously harmful
should be treated harshly.  Where the offending conduct has re-
deeming procompetitive benefits, however, less stringent relief
would ordinarily be appropriate.  Here, again, the court must de-
termine a decree’s potential for overdeterrence by chilling poten-
tially procompetitive, and hence beneficial, behavior.
4. Strength of Case
The remedy should relate to the strength of the government’s
case on liability issues.  The stronger the proof on the merits, the
harsher the sanction should be.  Doubts about the quality of
proof call for a milder penalty.  Similarly, where the quantum of
proof is questionable, more moderate sanctions are appropriate.
Strength of proof is important because the stronger the proof,
the less likelihood of factual error, and conversely, the greater
277 Hippocratic Oath, available at  http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/doctors/
oath_classical.html. (last visited June 28, 2005).
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likelihood that the remedy in question will restore competition to
the marketplace.
5. History of Misconduct
In formulating a remedy, the court must also take into account
the past behavior of the defendant.  Where the defendant has
been subject to conduct decrees in the past but continues to com-
mit illegal acts, conduct restrictions may not be sufficient.  Fail-
ure to comply with decrees in the past calls into question whether
a firm will comply with conduct restrictions in the future and sug-
gests that divestiture is appropriate.  Similarly, if conduct decrees
have been entered in the past and have failed to rejuvenate com-
petition in a given market, divestiture is the preferred remedy.
6. Resiliency of the Marketplace
The remedy should take into account the resiliency of the mar-
ketplace.  An entrenched defendant needs to be uprooted; but
where the market is changing rapidly, a less severe remedy may
be warranted.  Timing is critical.  In high-tech markets, which are
in a constant state of flux, less aggressive intervention is more
appropriate than in traditional markets, which are slower to re-
spond to competitive initiatives and possibly in need of a jump
start through divestiture.  Courts must be especially cautious in
declaring conduct remedies in fast-paced high-tech markets, lest
they issue decrees that address behavior that has changed drasti-
cally from the time that liability was established and hence bear
no relevance to the real-time competitive situation.
7. Cost of Administration
The remedy must also consider the cost of administration and
weigh that cost against the competitive benefit to be achieved.278
As discussed above,279 conduct remedies are generally costly to
administer because they require ongoing supervision.  They also
substitute regulation for free market forces.  In theory, divesti-
ture achieves the desired goals without need of additional judi-
cial intervention.280  However, the reality is that even where
divestiture is ordered, it is often accompanied by conduct restric-
278 Sullivan, supra  note 268, at 406-10.
279 See supra  note 198 and accompanying text.
280 Sullivan, supra  note 268, at 406.
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tions requiring court supervision.281  Moreover, even in cases of
divestiture, some amount of post-decree judicial monitoring is re-
quired, if only to assure that the divested companies do not at-
tempt to reconstitute themselves as a single entity.282
F. Deregulation: An Analogy
Deregulation, while not an antitrust remedy as such, has
brought about structural changes in various industries and may
inform any discussion of structural remedies.  Deregulation
started in the 1970s when the Carter Administration began lifting
federal controls over airline routes and fares.283  The results have
been spectacular.  Fares are down; ridership is up.  More people
have flown more miles on more flights to more destinations than
was ever the case in a regulated regime.284  The lesson here is
simple.  Consumer welfare is better served by competition than
by regulation.  From the perspective of antitrust remedies, this
suggests that structural remedies, which normally entail little or
no regulation, are superior to conduct remedies, which are by
their nature regulatory.
III
ENFORCING SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS:
PROCEDURAL ISSUES
The foregoing discussion demonstrates that the government
and private parties may invoke a formidable array of substantive
remedies to combat antitrust violations.  The Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure285 and the Federal Judicial Code286 provide the
vehicles for enforcing these remedies in federal court.  This Part
of the Article will discuss whether existing procedural devices are
adequate to permit victims of antitrust violations to obtain re-
dress or whether the rules unfairly victimize defendants.
A generation ago, eminent antitrust scholar Milton Handler
decried antitrust class actions as “legalized blackmail.”287  He ar-
281 Id .
282 Id .
283 Edwin McDowell, Five Questions:  He Freed the Airlines.  But What to Do
Now? N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 1999, § 3 (interview with Professor Alfred E. Kahn).
284 James C. Miller, III, Flying High 25 Years After Deregulation , WASH. TIMES,
Oct. 15, 1998, at A15.
285 FED. R. CIV. P. (codified in 28 U.S.C.).
286 Codified in 28 U.S.C.
287 Milton Handler, The Shift from Substantive to Procedural Innovations in Anti-
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gued that liberalized procedures for class certification  embodied
in the 1966 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
coupled with the reluctance of courts to dismiss cases prior to
trial, had tilted the antitrust playing field decidedly, and unfairly,
in favor of plaintiffs.288  Others claim that notice pleading gives
plaintiffs an unfair leg up in litigation.289  According to these crit-
ics, the rules easing plaintiffs’ paths to trial increase both the ex-
pense and, more importantly, the risks of defending antitrust
actions and leave the defendants little choice but to buy peace,
irrespective of the merits of the claim.290
On the other side, critics maintain that the present procedural
system is inadequate.  For example, they point out that under the
Supreme Court’s Lexecon291decision, district courts assigned
multidistrict actions may handle only the pretrial phases of the
case and may not retain the case for trial purposes.292  Sending
cases back to their home districts for trial creates obvious ineffi-
ciencies and delays.293  Congress has sought to address the
problems of burgeoning multiforum, multijurisdictional, and
multiparty litigation by expanding federal subject matter jurisdic-
tion.294  Congress has also expressed concern that courts do not
adequately scrutinize class action settlements and approve agree-
ments that provide consumers with little benefit, while awarding
attorneys sizable fees.295  Set forth below is a discussion of these
criticisms.
trust Suits—The Twenty-Third Annual Antitrust Review , 71 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 9
(1971).
288 Id . at 10-12.
289 See, e.g. , Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1106 (7th Cir.
1984), cert. denied , 470 U.S. 1054 (1985) (“When the requisite elements [of an anti-
trust claim] are lacking, the costs of modern federal antitrust litigation and the in-
creasing caseload of the federal courts counsel against sending the parties into
discovery when there is no reasonable likelihood that the plaintiffs can construct a
claim from the events related in the complaint.”); see generally  Edward D.
Cavanagh, Pleading Rules in Antitrust Cases:  A Return to Fact Pleading? , 21 REV.
LITIG. 1, 9-12 (2002).
290 Handler, supra  note 287, at 9-10.
291 Lexecon, Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26 (1998).
292 See JAY TIDMARSH & ROGER H. TRANGSRUD, COMPLEX LITIGATION AND
THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM 523 (1998); see generally  Mark Herrmann, Self-Transfers
Gone After Lexecon? , N.Y.L.J., Nov. 23, 1998, at 58.
293 TIDMARSH & TRANGSRUD, supra  note 292; Herrmann, supra  note 292.
294 Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, PUB. L. NO. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4.
295 Id .
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A. Notice Pleading
Notice pleading is a favorite whipping boy of antitrust skep-
tics,296 but it is not the culprit that antitrust foes make it out to
be.  Notice pleading, adopted as part of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure in 1938, has reshaped the role of the pleadings in
federal civil actions.297  The drafters of the Federal Rules recog-
nized that pleading practices, which had evolved under common
law and continued under the codes, were cumbersome and
hyper-technical, focusing the court’s attention on the form of the
allegations in a complaint rather than on the underlying merit of
the plaintiff’s claim.298  Not surprisingly, results often turned on
form rather than substance, with victory going to the party whose
lawyer had a superior knowledge of pleading rules.
The drafters of the Federal Rules were of the view that merito-
rious claims should have their day in court and that pleadings
should facilitate, not hinder, that process.299  To that end, the
Federal Rules adopted a simplified pleading system, commonly
known as notice pleading.  In the view of the drafters, the most
important function of the pleadings is to put the adversary on
notice of the claims or defenses being asserted.300  Accordingly, it
is neither required nor necessarily desirable that the complaint
assert detailed “facts” giving rise to a “cause of action.”  Rather,
the complaint need only contain a “short, plain statement of
facts” upon which the plaintiff’s claim for relief depends.301  It is
contemplated that the complaint contain a summary statement of
events and occurrences giving rise to the plaintiff’s claim and that
the details of that claim are developed through pretrial
discovery.302
Critics argue that notice pleading unfairly stacks the deck
against antitrust defendants, forcing them to settle insubstantial
claims rather than shoulder the expense of defending such
claims.303  That is simply not the case.  First, all pleadings are sub-
296 See  Cavanagh, supra  note 289, at 11.
297 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS
§ 68 (6th ed. 2002).
298 Id .
299 Id .
300 Id .
301 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(1).
302 WRIGHT & KANE, supra  note 297.
303 Gary Myers, Litigation As A Predatory Practice , 80 KY. L.J. 565, 591 (1992)
(noting that defendants may choose to settle cases, apart from the merits, to avoid
large outlays on discovery).
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ject to scrutiny under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure.  Rule 11 is designed to assure the integrity of pleadings
by requiring attorneys to undertake a pre-filing investigation of
both fact and law and to certify that the allegations have eviden-
tiary support and are warranted by existing law or by a good-
faith argument for changing existing law.304  If the court finds
that the allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint are frivolous, then
it may exercise its discretion and impose sanctions on the plain-
tiff, its counsel, or both.305  The nature of the sanction is also dis-
cretionary with the court and may include substantial monetary
penalties.306  Thus, any concern that notice pleading encourages
antitrust plaintiffs to file baseless claims is specifically addressed
by Rule 11.
Second, complaints can be tested for sufficiency at the outset
of the litigation and dismissed if they fail to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure.307  In theory, the standards for dis-
missing claims under Rule 12(b)(6) are stringent.308  However,
the reality is that courts, including antitrust courts, utilize rule
12(b)(6) to eliminate from their dockets cases that, although not
baseless, are expensive, time consuming, and have little chance
for success at trial.309
Third, the merits of a claim can be tested prior to trial—typi-
cally at the close of discovery—through a motion for summary
judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules by Civil Pro-
304 FED. R. CIV. P. 11.
305 Id .
306 Id .
307 FED R. CIV P. 12(b)(6).
308 Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957) (describing that a complaint will
withstand a motion to dismiss unless it appears “beyond [a] doubt that the plaintiff
can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief”).
309 See  Christopher M. Fairman, The Myth of Notice Pleading , 45 ARIZ. L. REV.
987, 1013-14 (2003).
District courts seemed primed to embrace heightened pleading as a solu-
tion to both the rising costs of litigation—chiefly discovery—and mounting
federal caseloads.  Dismissal at the pleading stage would conserve re-
sources for courts and litigants alike.  Not surprisingly, after Associated
General , lower courts routinely dismissed antitrust complaints for failure to
plead with particularity relying on footnote 17 [in Associated General].
Id.  at 1013-14 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added); see also  Car Carriers, Inc. v.
Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1106 (7th Cir. 1984) (describing that considerations
of cost and judicial workload militate in favor of dismissing claims where there is no
reasonable likelihood that plaintiff can succeed at trial).
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cedure.310  If a court, treating the allegations in the complaint as
true and assuming that the defendant does not contest the plain-
tiff’s evidence, concludes that a reasonable person could not find
for the plaintiff, then it must enter summary judgment in defen-
dant’s favor.311  While the federal courts may have been some-
what hesitant about granting summary judgment in early
antitrust cases,312 the Supreme Court made clear in the Matsu-
shita  case that no special exception to Rule 56 existed for anti-
trust cases and that summary judgment is as appropriate in
antitrust cases as it is in any other area of the law.313  Since Mat-
sushita , courts have regularly granted summary judgment to
eliminate from their dockets cases where the evidence adduced
by plaintiffs in discovery is not sufficient to create a jury
question.314
In short, the checks and balances built into the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure—Rule 11 sanctions, Rule 12 motions to dis-
miss, and Rule 56 motions for summary judgment—offset any
argument that notice pleading unfairly tilts the playing field in
favor of plaintiffs.
B. Discovery Rules
In addition to notice pleading, critics of antitrust point to the
liberal discovery provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure as a factor that unfairly favors plaintiffs in antitrust litiga-
tion.315  Again, that criticism is wide of the mark.  Discovery is
the “Cinderella of changes” under the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure.316  Unknown at common law, discovery is an equitable
device designed to assure parties equal access to proof and
thereby prevent trial by ambush.317  The drafters contemplated
that the parties would exchange all relevant, non-privileged ma-
terial bearing on the subject matter of the action prior to trial.318
Accordingly, the trial itself would be nothing more than an or-
derly presentation of what was obtained in discovery.
310 FED. R. CIV. P. 56.
311 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
312 See, e.g. , Poller v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 368 U.S. 464 (1962).
313 Matsushita , 475 U.S. at 585-88.
314 See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COM-
PETITION AND ITS PRACTICE § 16.8(b) (2d. ed. 1999).
315 See  Cavanagh, supra  note 289, at 10-11.
316 WRIGHT & KANE, supra  note 297, § 81.
317 Id .
318 Id .
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Critics argue that broad discovery puts antitrust defendants at
a particular disadvantage because discovery costs are typically so
high that cost considerations alone force defendants to settle irre-
spective of the merits of the case.319  Unquestionably, discovery
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure can be very expen-
sive, especially in the complex, document-intensive cases that
typify antitrust practice.  Indeed, with the dawning of the Big
Case Era in the 1960s, the costs of discovery began to soar.320  At
the same time, these costs were inflated by abusive tactical uses
of discovery—i.e., use of discovery for the principal purpose of
forcing the adversary to expend time and money—and litigants,
especially defendants, complained that discovery costs had got-
ten out of control and that steps needed to be taken to rein in
discovery.321
In 1983, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were amended to
provide a proportionality standard for discovery; i.e., discovery
must be proportional to the needs of the case.322  In addition, the
1983 amendments empowered the courts to limit discovery that
was repetitive, redundant, or not cost-effective.323  The 1983
amendments also provided for mandatory sanctions for viola-
tions of discovery standards.324  Finally, courts were encouraged
actively to manage discovery so as to minimize delay and
inefficiency.325
In 1993, the discovery rules were further amended to provide
presumptive limits on the number of interrogatories that could
be served in a case (twenty-five per side) and on the number of
depositions in a case (ten per side).326  The 1993 amendments
sought to achieve further cost savings by mandating disclosure of
certain core materials prior to initiating discovery and without
the necessity of a request.327  The 1993 amendments also require
319 See  Myers, supra  note 303.
320 Handler, supra  note 287, at 7-8.
321 See  Maurice Rosenberg & Warren R. King, Curbing Discovery Abuse in Civil
Litigation:  Enough Is Enough , 1981 BYU L. REV. 579 (1981); Section of Litig. Am.
Bar Ass’n, Second Report of the Special Committee for the Study of Discovery
Abuse , 92 F.R.D. 137, 139 (1982); Wayne D. Brazil, Civil Discovery:  How Bad are
the Problems? , 67 A.B.A. J. 450 (1981).
322 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2).
323 Id .
324 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g).
325 FED. R. CIV. P. 16.
326 FED. R. CIV. P. 33(a).
327 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a).
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\84-1\ORE103.txt unknown Seq: 65 31-OCT-05 11:51
Antitrust Remedies Revisited 211
the parties to develop, and the court to approve, a discovery plan
prior to the commencement of pretrial discovery.328  In 2000, the
Federal Rules were amended yet again.  The 2000 amendments
establish a presumptive time limit of one seven-hour day for each
deposition.329
Thus, in the last twenty years, significant amendments to the
discovery rules have limited the amount of discovery and hence
its cost, as well as the time necessary to conduct discovery.  The
Advisory Committee has been responsive to concerns that dis-
covery has become unduly expensive.  More importantly, the fact
that discovery is expensive puts antitrust defendants at no special
disadvantage.  Discovery is a two-way street.  If discovery is ex-
pensive for defendants, it is likewise expensive for plaintiffs.  Fi-
nally, the discovery rules themselves are party neutral and confer
no special benefit on either plaintiffs or defendants.
C. Class Actions
Critics also cite the perceived ease with which plaintiffs can
gain class certification of their claims as yet another example of
how the antitrust playing field is tilted against defendants.330
Rule 23 governing class actions has always been part of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure.  But it was not until 1966, when
Rule 26(b)(3) was amended to permit class  action treatment in
cases where common questions of law or fact predominate over
individual issues and the class action device is a superior mecha-
nism for conducting the litigation, that class actions in antitrust
cases became commonplace.331
The class action procedures offer significant benefits to the liti-
gants and to the judicial system as a whole.332  First, the class
action limits proliferation of litigation and promotes efficiency by
allowing the courts to hear claims arising out of common ques-
tions of law fact in one action, instead of in many separate
suits.333  Second, the class action levels the litigation playing field
by assuring that plaintiffs with meritorious claims giving rise to
only nominal damages, which individually would not justify liti-
328 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f).
329 FED R. CIV. P. 30(d)(2).
330 Handler, supra  note 287, at 9-11.
331 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
332 See generally  Stephen Calkins, An Enforcement Official’s Reflections on Anti-
trust Class Actions , 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 413, 437-45 (1997).
333 Id . at 437-38.
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gation expenses of federal actions but would on a class-wide ba-
sis, have access to the federal courts.334  Such actions also prevent
defendants from retaining ill-gotten gains and, in that respect,
complement the substantive goals of antitrust enforcement.
Third, in class action litigation, all members of the class are
bound by the court’s decision under the doctrines of claim pre-
clusion and issue preclusion.335
Notwithstanding these benefits, the class action mechanism is
not without its critics.  As discussed above,336 the harshest criti-
cism of class actions was leveled by the late Milton Handler, who
described the liberalized version of Rule 26(b)(3) which took ef-
fect in 1966 as “legalized blackmail.”  Handler’s concern was that
once a class was certified, defendants acting from a business per-
spective had little choice but to pay a settlement, irrespective of
the merits of the case, given the costs and risks inherent in any
litigation, especially antitrust litigation.337
Perhaps the best response to Handler is that even if the availa-
bility of class actions creates incentives to bring extortionate liti-
gation against monied but otherwise guiltless defendants, the
civil justice system will counterbalance these incentives, including
Rule 12 motions to dismiss,338 Rule 56 motions for summary
judgment,339 Rule 11 sanctions,340 and the possibility of interloc-
utory appeal of the class certification order.341  Moreover, the
certification process itself roots out claims that are not worthy of
class treatment.  In addition, Handler’s fundamental premise is
flawed because it implicitly assumes that defendants are never
guilty of wrongdoing.  Because Handler’s criticism is loaded with
pro-defendant (or anti-plaintiff) bias, it is difficult to lend
credence to that view.
A second criticism of class actions is that courts have histori-
cally been too hasty in granting class action certification and re-
luctant to reconsider certification decisions at a later point in the
litigation.342  Rule 23 initially provided that certification deci-
334 Id .
335 WRIGHT & KANE, supra  note 297, § 72.
336 See supra  note 287 and accompanying text.
337 See supra  note 287 and accompanying text.
338 FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
339 FED. R. CIV. P. 56.
340 FED. R. CIV. P. 11.
341 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f).
342 FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (Advisory Committee Notes).
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sions be made “as soon as practicable” after commencement of
the action and also empowered the courts to grant conditional
class certification.343  The upshot was that courts were more than
willing to grant certification at the outset with a view that the
issue could be revisited at a subsequent point in the litigation.
For defendants, however, granting certification, even conditional
certification, was the signal to throw in the towel and settle.
The Advisory Committee was sympathetic to this second criti-
cism and sought to address it in the 2003 amendments to Rule 23,
effective December 1, 2003.  The drafters made two subtle but
profound changes to Rule 23(c).  First, the “as soon as practica-
ble” language was changed to “at an early practicable time.”344
Second, the language authorizing conditional certification was
eliminated in the 2003 amendments.  The message to the district
courts is to slow the certification process down, if necessary, in
order to assure that certification decisions are made thoughtfully
and not in haste.345  A more deliberate process is likely to pro-
duce a fairer result in the view of the Advisory Committee.346
Elimination of conditional certification powers also attempts to
rectify the perceived imbalance of the class certification process.
Conditional certification allowed courts to certify classes for the
time being after a quick look at the facts.  Rule 23(c) as amended
is designed to have courts take a hard look at the facts before
issuing a certification order that cannot be lightly revoked.
A third criticism of the class action mechanism is that some
class suits are fee generated.347  As a threshold matter, the fact
that suits may be fee generated is not itself a basis for criticism.
By providing that prevailing plaintiffs are entitled to attorneys’
fees, Congress fully intended to encourage private enforcement
actions in order to maximize antitrust deterrence.348  Few would
argue that point.  Critics are concerned, not about fee awards
themselves, but rather that fee awards create incentives for plain-
tiffs’ attorneys to bring marginal, or perhaps baseless, suits in the
hope of scoring a quick settlement from vulnerable defend-
343 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1).
344 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1) (Supp. 2004).
345 Id . (Advisory Committee Notes).
346 FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (Advisory Committee Notes).
347 See In re  Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 98 F.R.D. 48 (E.D. Pa. 1983), modified ,
751 F.2d 562 (3d Cir. 1984).
348 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2000).
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ants.349  This view is a variation of the Handler criticism dis-
cussed above.350  The response again is that Rule 12 motions to
dismiss, Rule 56 motions for summary judgment, and Rule 11
sanctions serve to minimize the problem of baseless suits.
There is, however, a second criticism of fee-generated suits.
Many class action suits generate substantial fees for counsel but
produce little, if any, benefit to the alleged victims of the wrong-
doing.351  Coupon settlements, wherein plaintiffs settle for “cents
off” coupons while their attorneys are paid their full fees in cash
fall within this category.  Coupon settlements may take the form
of a discount certificate on future purchases from defendants, or,
as in the case of airlines, a right to discounts on future travel.
Coupon settlements are of dubious value to the victims of anti-
trust violations.  First, the plaintiffs may never bother to redeem
the coupon.  For example, they may not need equipment or de-
sire to travel, or they may simply wish to deal with other vendors.
Second, even if they do choose to redeem the coupons, there
may be no real financial benefit.  For instance, if plaintiffs have a
discount certificate to buy equipment from the phone company,
they may be able to buy comparable equipment more cheaply
from Circuit City or Radio Shack.  Similarly, if the plaintiffs re-
ceive discounts off of future travel on a given airline, such “com-
pensation” may prove meaningless if they are able to obtain
lower net fares through Orbitz or Travelocity.  Clearly, the types
of coupon settlements described here, which are not atypical,
confer no real benefits on the plaintiffs.  Equally important, de-
fendants are not forced to disgorge their ill-gotten gains when
coupons are not redeemed.  In such situations, it is difficult to
justify paying attorneys their full fees in cash, instead of in kind.
Congress is attempting to address the inequities of coupon set-
tlements through the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005.352  First,
courts are directed to give careful scrutiny to coupon settlements
to assure that these settlements confer a real benefit on plaintiffs
(as opposed to plaintiffs’ attorneys).353  Second, fees awarded to
plaintiffs’ counsel would be commensurate with the benefit actu-
349 Handler, supra  note 287, at 9-11.
350 Id .
351 In re Fine Paper , 98 F.R.D. at 67; see also  Class Action Fairness Act of 2005,
Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4.
352 119 Stat. § 1 at 4.
353 Id . § 3, at 6.
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\84-1\ORE103.txt unknown Seq: 69 31-OCT-05 11:51
Antitrust Remedies Revisited 215
ally conferred.354  Thus, coupon settlements would not be barred,
but proponents would have the burden of demonstrating their
fairness and adequacy.  The legislation would certainly curb the
widespread abuses in coupon settlements.
A fairer criticism of class actions, which like the third ema-
nates from the consumer protection side, is the limitation on the
ability of class members in cases certified under Rule 23(b)(3) to
opt out of a settlement in which they do not concur.355  When-
ever a case is certified under Rule 23(b)(3), prospective class
members are notified of the nature of the proceedings and their
right to opt out of the action.356  Class members must take af-
firmative steps to opt out.357  If they do nothing, they are bound
by the courts’ rulings as to the class.358  In particular, class mem-
bers are bound by any settlements reached by the class represen-
tative and approved by the courts.359  Historically, class members
who disapproved of the settlement could file objections with the
court and attempt to persuade the court that the settlement
would not be fair and adequate;360 but there was no right to opt
out at the settlement stage.361  If the court approved the settle-
ment over any objections, the dissidents were nevertheless
bound.362
The 2003 amendments to the Federal Rules addressed this con-
cern by empowering courts, in the exercise of their discretion, to
permit dissident class members to opt out of the case at the set-
tlement stage.363  The Advisory Committee created this possibil-
ity out of concern about “forces of inertia and ignorance that
may undermine the value of a pre-settlement opportunity to elect
354 Id .
355 See  Report of the Judicial Conference Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure to the Chief Justice of the United States and Members of the Judicial
Conference of the United States (Sept. 2002) [hereinafter “Report of the Judicial
Conference Committee”], available at  http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/jc09-2002/Re-
port.pdf (last visited June 30, 2005).
356 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2).
357 Id .
358 Id .
359 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1797
(3d ed. 2002).
360 Id .
361 Id .
362 Id .
363 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(3) (Supp. 2004); WRIGHT ET AL., supra  note 359, § 1797
(Supp. 2004).
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exclusion.”364  Simply put, the drafters were concerned that at
the time of certification when the opt out decision must be made,
putative class members do not fully appreciate the ramifications
of failure to opt out until presented with a settlement that they
oppose.365
Not surprisingly, however, the second opt out concept has
been controversial.  Opponents argue that: (1) second opt out en-
courages strategic behavior by class members which complicates
the settlement process and may render universal settlements im-
possible;366 (2) second opt out encourages free riding by counsel
for individual class members, who secure the benefits of actions
by class counsel and assert themselves only at the time of settle-
ment;367 and (3) many individual class members have a signifi-
cant stake in the litigation and hence to a great extent are
immune to the “forces of inertia and ignorance.”368
The Advisory Committee struck a middle course by allowing
second opt out as a matter of judicial discretion rather than as a
matter of individual right.  It is far too early to even attempt an
assessment of second opt out.  Vigilance by the courts in rooting
out opportunistic plaintiffs is essential to achieving the goals of
fairness and adequacy without undermining the class action rem-
edy as a whole.
D. Lexecon
In 1969, Congress created the Judicial Panel for Multidistrict
Litigation (“JPML”)369 to address concerns of cost and ineffi-
ciency arising from multidistrict litigation.  The JPML, sua
sponte , or upon motion by a party, consolidates actions filed in
districts throughout the United States involving common claims
against common defendants before one federal judge for pretrial
purposes.370  Once discovery is complete and the case is ready for
364 See  Report of the Civil Rules Advisory Committee, May 20, 2002, at 63, avail-
able at  http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/supct1202/CVReport-final.pdf (last visited
June 30, 2005).
365 FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (Advisory Committee Notes).
366 See  Report of the Eastern District of New York Committee on Civil Litigation
Regarding the Proposed 2001 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
December 6, 2001, at 7-8 (on file w/ author).
367 Id .
368 Id .
369 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2000).
370 Id .
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\84-1\ORE103.txt unknown Seq: 71 31-OCT-05 11:51
Antitrust Remedies Revisited 217
trial, the matter is then sent back to its home district.371  In creat-
ing this legislation, Congress struck a compromise between effi-
ciency and plaintiff’s choice of forum.  Permitting common cases
to be consolidated for pretrial purposes would create significant
efficiencies in the discovery process.  Requiring the case to be
returned to the originating district for trial would honor plain-
tiff’s choice of forum.
Because most cases are either settled or otherwise resolved
before the JPML, the provisions requiring trial-ready cases to be
transferred back to the district of filing has had little practical
effect.  These provisions only matter in those rare cases that actu-
ally go to trial.  From an efficiency perspective, it makes little
sense for the JPML judge, who has supervised the case from the
beginning and is presumably thoroughly versed in the facts, to
send the case to a new judge with no knowledge of the case for
trial.  The JPML sought to cure the problem by creating a local
rule empowering the assigned judge to retain for trial cases that
have completed discovery.372
This so-called self-transfer provision, however, was struck
down by the Supreme Court in Lexecon .373  The Court con-
cluded that it was up to Congress, not the JPML, to decide where
cases would ultimately be tried.374  Although it has debated the
issue, Congress has not yet taken steps to overrule Lexecon .  This
is a situation that Congress can, and should, remedy immediately
by authorizing JPML-assigned judges to retain matters for trial.
The systemic concern for efficiency far outweighs the interests of
individual litigants in retaining the right to try their cases in the
forum of initial filing.
E. Multijurisdictional, Multidistrict, Multiparty Claims
Historically, nearly all antitrust litigation has been conducted
in federal courts.  In large part, this is due to the fact that juris-
diction under the antitrust laws is exclusively federal; i.e., federal
antitrust claims may not be asserted in state courts.375  Antitrust
claims could, however, be asserted in state courts under state
371 Id .  An exception to the rule is the in parens patriae  cases brought under the
Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, where the assigned judge
was authorized to retain the case for trial purposes. Id.  § 1407(h).
372 J.P.M.L. R. 14(b).
373 Lexecon, Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26 (1998).
374 See id . at 28.
375 See supra  note 45 and accompanying text.
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law.376  Still, most attorneys choose to proceed in federal court
under federal law.  There are several explanations for this de-
cided preference for federal courts.  First, the federal law is gen-
erally much better developed and more broadly applicable than
state law.  Second, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are
much more user-friendly than some archaic state procedural
codes.  Third, rightly or wrongly, many attorneys perceive federal
judges, who are appointed by the President for life tenure, to be
more competent than state court judges, many of whom are
elected.
In the last decade, a new litigation paradigm has emerged.
More and more antitrust litigants are turning to state court for
relief.  In large part, this is due to the Supreme Court’s 1977 deci-
sion in Illinois Brick,  which held that only those who purchased
directly from price-fixers, and not others in the chain of distribu-
tion, could sue for damages under the antitrust laws.377  Accord-
ingly, consumers and other potential plaintiffs in price-fixing
cases who had overcharges passed onto them by direct purchas-
ers were precluded from suing under federal law.378  In the wake
of Illinois Brick , many states enacted “Illinois Brick  repealer”
statutes permitting indirect purchasers to sue in state courts.379
Thus, state law may provide an avenue of relief foreclosed by
federal law.
Illinois Brick , however, is not the only explanation for the mi-
gration to state court.  Some attorneys believe that they can ex-
tract a better bargain by proceeding in state court, separately
from a class action pending in federal court.  Where there are
multijurisditional lawsuits, it is impossible to get all cases before
one judge by invoking the JPML.  Because all parties are not
before a single judge, it is not possible for defendants to achieve
peace by resolving the federal cases.  State court claimants are
free to, and often do, engage in strategic behavior and thereby
exact a better deal than their JPML counterparts.  The greater
the number of state cases filed, the more vexing the problem of
strategic behavior becomes.
Another reason that attorneys seek out state venues is the be-
lief that they will get a better result in state court.  Many antitrust
376 See supra  note 44 and accompanying text.
377 Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
378 Id .
379 See supra  note 50 and accompanying text.
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plaintiffs’ attorneys view federal judges as hostile to antitrust
claims.  State court judges are perceived to be more hospitable to
antitrust claims because: (1) they see such claims infrequently
and are reluctant to dismiss claims prior to trial, and (2) they are
elected and do not want to be perceived as anti-consumer.
In addition, some attorneys want to be in state court because
they believe that fee petitions will receive less scrutiny in state
court as opposed to federal court.  Equally important, in state
court the attorney is captain of the ship and not at the mercy of
lead counsel as would be the case in JPML proceedings.
Whatever the reason underlying the migration of antitrust liti-
gation from federal to state courts, this proliferation of antitrust
filings involving common issues of fact and law has effectively
thwarted the ability of the federal civil justice system to manage
complex litigation that is nationwide in scope and has imposed
significant burdens on the state courts.  Congress has recognized
this problem and has attempted to address it through the Class
Action Fairness Act of 2005.380  That law expands federal diver-
sity jurisdiction to permit most antitrust cases currently filed in
state court under state law to be removed to federal court.381
The Act could be an important step forward because it once
again enables the federal courts under the JPML to transfer all
cases involving common claims against common parties to one
judge for pretrial proceedings and settlement discussions.  How-
ever, the Act is not a complete solution to the problem.  It does
not address the issue of transfer by the JPML for trial , as well as
pretrial, purposes.  Nor does it address the panoply of substan-
tive problems that arise in attempts by indirect purchasers to es-
tablish injury under the antitrust laws.  Still, the law is an
important step forward in addressing a burgeoning problem.
F. Coupon Settlements
The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 also addresses a concern
of consumer groups that settlements in which plaintiffs receive
coupons or other types of in-kind payments are not fair and ade-
quate and therefore should not be approved by the court.382  The
principal concern is that in cases involving coupon settlements,
attorneys normally get their full fees in cash, while the victims of
380 Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005).
381 Id .
382 Id .
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wrongdoing are left with paper which they may or may not re-
deem, and which, in any event, may confer no real benefits.  In
such cases, there is an obvious potential for conflict of interest
because an attorney who is going to be paid in cash may not have
the interests of coupon-receiving clients at heart.  The legislation
would address this problem by: (1) requiring the courts closely to
scrutinize coupon and other in-kind settlements for fairness and
adequacy; and (2) limiting attorneys’ fees to the actual  value of
the settlement, not the stated value.383
IV
ASSESSMENT
A. Enforcement Policies
1. Federal Enforcement
The enforcement policies of the Antitrust Division and the
FTC reflect an increasingly sophisticated understanding of
microeconomic principles and how certain business practices
promote competition while others inure to the detriment of the
consumer.  Over the last fifteen years, a bipartisan consensus has
emerged regarding the goals of antitrust enforcement.384  During
that time, the agencies have focused investigative and
prosecutorial resources on bread-and-butter issues—horizontal
price-fixing and division of markets, and mergers that threaten to
raise prices or reduce output.385  That approach is prudent and
should continue.  The Justice Department’s use of criminal sanc-
tions to punish cartel behavior and to deter future transgressions
is likewise on target.
In addition, there is widespread recognition that in a global-
ized economy, the United States’ antitrust laws cannot operate in
a vacuum.386  Foreign cartel behavior that adversely affects U.S.
consumers must be prosecuted as aggressively as domestic viola-
tions.  To that end, cooperation with foreign antitrust authorities
is essential.  Efforts to promote common procedural and substan-
tive norms have been ongoing.387  Those efforts should continue
and should not be sidetracked because U.S. and EU regulators
383 Id .
384 See generally  Pitofsky, supra  note 52.
385 Id .
386 Id .
387 See  Int’l Competition Policy Advisory Comm’n Antitrust Div., Final Report to
the Attorney General and Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust,  Annex 1-C
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have reached differing conclusions on similar facts as was the
case in Microsoft388 and the GE/Honeywell389 merger.  Antitrust
regulators worldwide share much common ground; the focus of
international enforcement efforts should be on what unites us,
not what divides us.
2. State Antitrust Enforcement
a. Public Enforcement
Although Judge Posner makes a powerful argument for federal
preemption in antitrust enforcement,390 it would be a mistake to
eliminate state antitrust jurisdiction.  States have an important
role in the overall antitrust enforcement picture.  First, the states
serve a watchdog function to assure that federal authorities do
not abdicate their enforcement responsibilities.  It was the per-
ception that federal authorities had indeed abdicated their re-
sponsibilities that galvanized the states into action in the 1980s
and made states players in the antitrust game.  Much has been
done in the last fifteen years to bridge the ideological gap that
once existed between federal and state enforcers and to generate
a cooperative rather than contentious atmosphere.  Today every-
one is pretty much on the same page.  It is unlikely that the expe-
rience of the Reagan years will recur, but online state antitrust
enforcement agencies protect against the creation of any enforce-
ment void.
Second, states are well-equipped to handle essentially local
matters, including bid-rigging in state and local government pro-
curement and indirect purchaser suits, whether on behalf of the
state or consumers parens patriae .  In addition, state regulators
can play an effective role in the consumer protection area.391  In
other areas, specifically mergers, states as a rule should defer to
federal authorities, absent a strong state interest in a particular
transaction that has been overlooked in the federal investigation.
(2000), available at  http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/icpac/finalreport.htm (last visited June
30, 2005).
388 Commission Decision of 24.03.2004, supra  note 93; see  Meller, supra  note 93,
at 1.
389 Commission Decision of 03/07/2001, supra  note 92.
390 See  Posner, supra  note 66.
391 Remarks of Timothy J. Muris before New York State Bar Association,
NYSBA 2004 Antitrust Law Section Symposium, at 57 (Jan. 29, 2004) (“Our part-
ners in the states are extremely important . . . in both competition and consumer
protection, although the states put more resources obviously into consumer protec-
tion than they do into antitrust.”) (on file w/ author).
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\84-1\ORE103.txt unknown Seq: 76 31-OCT-05 11:51
222 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84, 2005]
This is especially true in cases where the merging parties are for-
eign.  The need for U.S. enforcement authorities to speak with
one voice will ordinarily trump local interest in challenging a
merger.  Third, states can perform a support role in nationwide
or international cases brought by federal authorities.392
b. Private Enforcement
Less clear is the role of private enforcement actions in state
court.  Private antitrust actions in state court tend to fall into
three categories: (1) cases involving purely intrastate restraints,
(2) indirect purchaser suits, and (3) cases involving nationwide or
international conspiracies in which plaintiff’s counsel has chosen
state court over federal court.
The third class of cases is troublesome.  By eschewing federal
court in favor of state court, plaintiffs’ attorneys effectively
thwart the ability of the federal courts to utilize multidistricting
procedures393 effectively to manage dockets, minimize duplica-
tive efforts, assure consistency of judgments, and avoid unneces-
sary delays.  Such tactics also avoid federal court scrutiny of
settlements and attorneys’ fees.  While suing in state court may
be in the interest of the plaintiff’s attorney, it is not necessarily in
the plaintiff’s interest and certainly not in the best interest of the
civil justice system.  As more fully discussed below,394 Congress’
attempt to eliminate this form of strategic behavior by expanding
federal jurisdiction to permit removal of these types of cases to
federal court is an important step forward.
B. Remedy
1. Damages
The treble damages remedy is the cornerstone of private anti-
trust enforcement.  It is a potent weapon; but given the poten-
tially devastating effect that antitrust violations, especially price-
fixing, may have in the marketplace, the treble damages remedy
is ultimately necessary to (a) preserve free markets, (b) deter fu-
ture violations, (c) compensate victims, (d) disgorge ill-gotten
392 A textbook example of cooperation between state and federal authorities oc-
curred during the investigation of the Thomson-West merger in 1996.  States contrib-
uted significant resources to review of documents, interviewing of facts and expert
witnesses, and depositions.
393 Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4.
394 See infra  notes 399-400 and accompanying text.
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gains, and (e) punish violators.  Elimination of treble damages
across the board would seriously impair the private remedy, and
the case for taking this drastic step has simply not been made.
On the other hand, opponents of mandatory trebling have a
point that trebling is neither fair nor desirable in every case.395
The problem with this view is that it is difficult to draw the line
between treble and simple damages; every proposal has its down-
sides as well as its benefits.396  This issue needs further debate.
At the end of the day, however, antitrust enforcement would
probably be best served by leaving mandatory trebling in place
and by letting Congress decide which types of antitrust violations
should be detrebled.  Congress should proceed with utmost cau-
tion in any foray into selective detrebling.
2. Equitable Relief
In the merger area, there is consensus on enforcement norms,
and available remedies are adequate to the problems that arise
from potentially anticompetitive transactions.  Still, it would be
desirable for the enforcement agencies to bring more merger
challenges in court so that the case law can develop more fully.
The non-merger area is another story.  Much work needs to be
done in determining how to fashion remedies in monopolization
cases. Microsoft  did not fulfill its promise of providing the
twenty-first-century standard for structural relief.  The existing
law on divestiture by monopolists is old and appears less relevant
by the day.  If any progress is to be made in this area, then it is up
to the Antitrust Division to continue aggressive enforcement of
Section 2 of the Sherman Act.397
However, this may be easier said than done.  In the wake of
the final resolution of the Microsoft  case, the Antitrust Division
may understandably be gun-shy about tackling another industry
giant.  More importantly, recent decisions, notably the Trinko
case,398 seem to take a kinder, gentler approach to monopolists.
The upshot is that it is getting harder for plaintiffs to win on lia-
395 See  Cavanagh, supra  note 96, at 847.
396 Id .
397 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
398 See, e.g. , Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis v. Trinko, LLP, 540
U.S. 398, 407 (2004) (stating that monopoly “is an important element of the free-
market system”); see also  United States v. AMR Corp., 335 F.3d 1109, 1111 (10th
Cir. 2003) (stating that predation by reputation is not an appropriate surrogate for
below-cost pricing in a predatory-pricing case).
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bility  issues in Section 2 Cases; courts are not even reaching the
remedies  issues.  The fact that the existing precedents on court-
ordered divestiture are at least forty years old only fuels argu-
ments of antitrust foes that antitrust law has not kept pace with
the changing face of the business world and is thus largely irrele-
vant in today’s economy.
C. Procedural Remedies
All in all, the procedural remedies available to federal antitrust
litigants are working well.  The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
provide checks and balances that assure fairness to all litigants.
Nevertheless, the system would benefit from several surgical
improvements.
First, Congress should overrule the Supreme Court’s decision
in Lexecon399  and thereby permit the JPML, in its discretion, to
retain cases for both trial and pretrial purposes.  This move
would significantly reduce cost and delay in multidistrict
litigation.
Second, Congress should expand federal subject matter juris-
diction so that all antitrust cases arising from a common nucleus
of operative fact, whether initiated in state or federal court, can
be consolidated before the JPML for pretrial and trial pur-
poses.400  This legislation would eliminate the current procedural
problem created by indirect purchaser suits, which are barred in
federal court by Illinois Brick  but may be brought in state court
under state law.  Among other things, the legislation would (1)
prevent attorneys from forum shopping for pro-plaintiff courts,
(2) foster efficiency in the administration of complex antitrust lit-
igation by reducing costs and duplication in discovery and by per-
mitting the assigned JPML judge to hear the matter at trial, (3)
encourage universal settlements by creating a mechanism to get
all parties to a dispute before a sole judge, and (4) limit the op-
portunities for plaintiffs’ lawyers to engage in strategic behavior
in cases originating in state court.  The Class Action Fairness Act
of 2005, while a step in the right direction, is unlikely to achieve
these ends because statutory loopholes permitting “local” con-
troversies to stay in state court may serve to thwart efforts at
removal in a significant number of cases.
Third, judges must take seriously recently enacted legislation
399 Lexecon, Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26 (1998).
400 Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4.
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that requires federal courts to scrutinize settlements in antitrust
cases in order to assure that plaintiffs are being paid something
of value when they settle cases and also to ensure that attorneys’
fees do not eclipse payments to plaintiffs.401  As a general rule,
coupon settlements should be rejected unless the parties can
demonstrate to the court that the plaintiffs are getting real value.
CONCLUSION
Although the economy has evolved significantly in the last
century, antitrust is as relevant today as it was when the Sherman
Act was passed in 1890.  Since that time, a broad consensus on
enforcement policies and substantive liability has emerged.  It is
time to forge a similar consensus in the field of antitrust
remedies.
401 Id .
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